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THE LIGHT OF TRUTH

— OR —

SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA.

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TRANSLATIONS.

THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RI'KANTA BHA'SHYA.

(*To be continued from page 29.*)

Now, as to the contention that I's'vara, as impelling jîva to action, would be guilty of partiality and the like, and that all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions addressed to him would be vain, the sùtrakâra says:

But with a view to the efforts made (by jiva), in order that the injunctions and prohibitions may not be purposeless, and so on. (II. iii. 41.)

Jîva, of his own accord, makes an effort towards activity or cessation of activity, in virtue of his karma having become ripe. With reference to this effort made by Jîva which leads to activity or cessation from activity, the Supreme Being impels jîva to action by giving His consent, as may be seen from injunctions and prohibitions having a purpose to serve and from the grace and punishment meted out by him. Just as a boy who, with the help of a stronger person, manages to convey a very heavy beam of wood, is still amenable to injunctions and prohibitions so far as his own efforts is concerned, so, though jîva engages in activity with the help of the Parames-vara, he is himself amenable to injunctions and prohibitions. Accordingly, as acting solely with reference to the efforts made by jiva, I'svara, who impels jîva to acts, is not guilty of partiality; and inasmuch as, even in the case of jîva, there exists an activity for which he has to rely on himself, it cannot be, we may conclude, that injunctions and prohibitions are purposeless.

Adhikarana. 12.

(Ji'va is) an integral part (of Brahman), because of the declaration of a distinction. And it is even otherwise; that (Brahman) is one with fishermen and so on, some do declare. (II. iii. 42).

It has been shown in the foregoing sections that Jîva is eternal, intelligent, extremely small; that he is an agent engaging in action with the help of Parames'vara. Here, a doubt arises as to whether jîva is Parames'vara Himself, or His intergral part.

(*Pûrvapaksha*:)—Jîva is Parames'vara Himself. Parames'vara Himself is manifested in the form of

jîva on account of the multifareous upâdhis or media of manifestation, just as the one âkâs'a manifests itself in various forms and is limited in space owing to the upâdhis such as a pot. Accordingly the s'ruti says "This A'tman is Brahman."* Therefore, I's'vara Himself has become jîva owing to ajnána or nescience.

Siddhánta:—The jîvâtman is indeed an *ams'a* of Parames'vara, an integral part of His body, as the s'ruti declares a distinction between them in the following passages:

"Entering into them in the form of this jîva, I shall differentiate name and form." †

"He who dwelling in the A'tman . . . ." ‡

"Thinking of the A'tman and the Impeller as separate . . . ." §

"Know then Prakriti is Mâyâ, and the Mahes'vara the possessor of Mâyâ. This whole world is filled with what constitutes a member of His." ||

As to the contention that Brahman Himself is jîva because of the s'ruti teaching "This A'tman is Brahman," the sûtrakâra says as follows: The oneness has to be explained otherwise. From such passages as "That thou art," "this A'tman is Brahman," we are to understand that jîva and Brahman are a unity because one pervades the other. Moreover, some clearly declare a unity of this sort in the following words: "The fishermen are Brahman, the servants are Brahman, these rogues are Brahman." Thus though jîva is an integral part of Brahman, he may be spoken of as Brahman, as pervaded by the latter, just as a faggot or the like, pervaded by fire, is spoken of as fire itself. Still, fire and faggot are not, indeed, one and the same. Therefore an integral of Brahman in himself, jîva attains to the form of Brahman. If we assume that Brahman Himself becomes jîva by ajñâna or nescience, it is impossible to avoid contradicting many a passage in the s'ruti.

Because of the mantra. (II. iii. 43.)

"A foot Thereof are all beings:" ¶ this Mantra gives us to understand that jîva is only a part (*ams'a*) of Brahman. The s'ruti,—namely,

"Know then Prakriti is Mâyâ, and Mahes'vara the possessor of Mâyâ. This whole world is filled with what constitutes a member of His."—

declares that Mâyâ is the *prakriti* or material cause, that Mahes'vara is endued with that Mâyâ, and that the whole universe constitutes His member. Wherefore, Purusha or Jîva is only a small portion of Parames'vara who is endued with Mâyâ.

It is even declared in the smriti. (II. iii. 44.)

"A'tman is the eighth form of S'iva, the Paramâtman, which penetrates other forms; the universe, therefore, is S'iva Himself."

From this passage in the smriti, A'tman is only one portion of S'iva's body.

But as in the case of lustre etc., not thus is the Supreme. (II. iii. 45.)

Though jîva is a portion of Brahman, yet the Parames'vara is not of the same nature and form as jîva. On the other hand, He is indeed endued with omniscience etc.—How?—Like lustre etc. Just as the lustre of gems etc. which possess it as their attribute constitutes a part thereof an, integral part of the composite whole, so, as embodied in Jîva, Brahman has jîva as an attribute of His, and the jîva forms a portion of Brahman.—The word "etc." (in the phrase "lustre etc." is intended to bring under the same category *jâti* (genus) and *guna* (quality) which always constitute attributes of substances.—Though attributes, as integral parts of the substances, constitute part and parcel of those substances, yet it involves no contradiction to maintain that they are distinct things, as shown by such passages of the s'ruti as the following:

"He who abides in A'tman."

And so the smriti also declares. (II. iii. 46).

"The body of the God of Gods is this universe, moving and unmoving. This thing the souls (pas'us) know not, owing to the strong bond (pâs'a)." And so on the smriti says. Wherefore, jîva is only a portion (ams'a) of Brahman. Brahman being the possessor of the portion, there is an essential distinction between them.

Permission and prohibition is due to connection with the body, as in the case of light etc. (II. iii. 47.)

(*Objection*:)—Though all jîvas are alike portions of Brahman, how is it that permission to study the vedas etc. is accorded to some, while it is prohibited in the case of others?

* Bri Up. 4-5-19.
† Chhâ. Up. 6-3-2.
‡ Bri. Up. 5-7-22.
§ Svetâsvatara-Upanishad 1-6.
|| Ibid. 4-10.
¶ Taitt. Aranyaka. 3-12.

(*Answer*): This may be explained as due to the connection with the brâhman body and so on, just as a distinction is made in the case of fire according as it is found in the house of a pious man or in the cremation ground.

As limited in space, they are all alike. (II. iii. 48.)

As different in the different bodies, as limited here and there in their atomic size, and thus not pervading everywhere, knowledge, pleasure and the like are of one sort in the case of those who identify themselves with the bodies feeling thus: 'I am stout' 'I am lean;' 'I am happy;' 'I am miserable;' 'I am a brâhmin;' I am a kshatriya.'—What is this tantamount to saying? —Because those who identify themselves with the body are alike limited in extent, their limited knowledge, pleasure etc., which are peculiar to samsâra, are of one and the same sort and do not get intermixed. From this it follows that in the case of those liberated souls who cease to identify themselves with the body, and who, by their all-pervasive nature, have risen to universal egoism, the samsâric knowledge etc., gives place to the inherent knowledge etc., which are eternal and infinite.

As to the contention that Brahman Himself becomes associated with ajnâna and upâdhi, the sûtrakâra replies that, in that case, there would be no definite order of things:

And it is a mere semblance. (II. iii. 49.)

The arguments adduced on behalf of both the theories,—namely that Brahman Himself becomes jîva when bound by an *upâdhi*, be it real or unreal,—are only semblances of reasoning.

To explain:

Because it cannot be defined by adrishta. (II. iii. 50.)

If A'tmans or jîvas be the creatures of real or unreal upâdhis, then, since *ajnâna* and *upâdhi* pertain to Brahman Himself, the relative positions (of Brahman and jîva, or of jîvas among themselves) cannot be defined even by adrishta (the unseen effect of actions) generated by them.

Moreover,

And so, too, in the case of purposes etc. (II. iii. 51.)

So, too, even as regards purposes which are the causes of *adrishta* (the unseen effects of actions,) the definite relations cannot be explained.

(If it be said that it is) due to (difference in space) (we reply) no, because of comprehension. (II. iii. 52.)

(*Objection*): The distinction is due to the distinction in the parts of Brahman associated with different upâdhis.

(*Answer*):—No; for, when the upâdhis are gone, all parts are comprehended in Brahman. Wherefore, according to either of the theories that Brahman is jîva when limited by upâdhi, be it real or unreal, the distinction cannot be explained. Wherefore it is quite reasonable to maintain that jîva is a part of Brahman and that jîva is of the nature of an attribute of Brahman.

THE FOURTH PÂDA.

Ahikarana—I.

So, the pra'nas. (II. iv. 1.)

It has been shewn before that *bhûtas* or elements of matter are born of Brahman, and that jîva is eternal. Now we have to enquire whether the sense-organs (*indriyas*) have a birth like the elements of matter, or they are eternal like jîvas. Just as, being eternal, the jîva is not born, so also are the sense-organs not born; for, there is the S'ruti which says that they also, like the jîva, are eternal. Accordingly, the S'ruti declares the continuance of sense-organs (prâṇas) at the time of pralaya or cosmic dissolution, in the following passages:

> "Non-existent this at first was. They asked what that non-existent was. *Rishis* indeed were the non-existent at first. Then they asked who are those *Rishis*? Prânas are verily the *Rishis*."*

Wherefore the sense-organs (prâṇa) are not born of Brahman.

As against the foregoing we hold as follows:

It is used in a secondary sense, because of an impossibility; and because the sruti declares that (to have existed) first. (II. iv. 2.)

The sense-organs did not exist prior to creation. On the other hand, it is Parames'vara that then existed, as the s'ruti declares "Existent alone, My dear, this at first was".† The words *rishi* and the word *prâna* apply only to Parame'svara. As He cannot be many, the use of the plural is only secondary. Hence the existence of Brahman alone prior to creation, not of the sense-organs.

The Sûtrakàra adduces another argument:

Speech being preceded by it. (II. IV. 3).

All others receive their names and forms only after Parames'vara's creation. The word *pra'na* used with reference to the time (prior to creation) cannot denote

*Sa'atapathabrâhmana. 6-1-1.

† Chhâ. Up. 6-2-1.

the sense-organs. Therefore, Brahman alone is the prior.

Adhikarana. 2.

Because seven are taught and specifically enumeratad.
(II. IV. 4).

Now, a doubt arises as to how many in mumber are the sense-organs which have been shewn before to have been born of Brahman.

Pûrvapaksha:—Seven.—Why?—Because seven only are enumerated in the following passage:

"When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state,"

And also because the number seven is specifically mentioned in the following passage:

"Seven prânas are born of Him."

As against the foregoing, the sùtrakára says:

But there are hands etc., when (jiva) abides (in the body); wherefore it is not so. (II. IV. 5).

The sense-organs are not seven only. Hands etc., too, are sense-organs, inasmuch as they are alike instruments of the jîva so long as he abides in the body. The sense-organs are, on the other hand, eleven in number, because of the s'ruti and the smriti.

"These ten are the prânas (sense-organs) in the person; and manas (âtman) is the eleventh."†

"The sense-organs, ten and one."‡

Buddhi etc. are not separate senses; but they are only different functions of manas. As to the speaking of the steadiness of seven sense-organs and their specific enumeration as seven it is due to their importance. Wherefore, sense-organs are not seven, but they are eleven in number.

Adhikarana. 3.

And (they are) small. (II. iv. 6).

A doubt arising as to whether those senses are all-pervading or very small, it may at first be thought that they are all-pervading, because of the eye and other sense-organs having the power of perceiving things at a distance. In reply we say that they are very small; for, the s'ruti says, "The prâna departing, all prânas (sense-organs) depart after it."* They are not all-pervading. If they were all-pervading their departure is not possible. The eye and other sense-organs have the power of perceiving things at a distance, not because they are all-pervading, but because they are luminous and very small and therefore pass very quickly. Wherefore the sense-organs are very small.

* Katha, Up. 2-6-10.
† Mahânârâyana. Up. 12.
‡ Bri. Up. 5-9-4.
§ Bhagavad-gita 13-5.

Adhikarana. 4.

And the chief. (II. iv. 7).

Here a doubt arises as to whether the vital air, with its five fold function——spoken of in the s'ruti as the chief of all prânas or vital activities in the words "The prâna departing, all prânas depart after it."—is born of Brahman or not.

(*Pûrvapaksha*:—The vital air is not born, because of the activity of the vital breath being declared to have existed, even prior to creation, in the words "It breathed windless." *

(*Siddhânta*:)—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Even the prâna-vâyu, the vital air, is born. The word 'breathed' does not refer to the activity of vital air, inasmuch as the word 'windless' points to its absence. It denotes only the existence of Brahman. Wherefore the prâna or vital air cannot be beginningless,

(*Objection*:)—Granted that this vital air has a birth; but it is not distinct from the activities of sense-organs, as said in another science in the words "A general function of the sense-organs are the five vital airs such as prâna or upward breath;" † or, it is not distinct from the material air as declared in the s'ruti "This vitality is the air" *

(Answer):—As against the foregoing, the Sûtrakâra says:

A. Mahadeva Sastri, B. A. F. T. S.,

(*To be continued*).

* Bri. Up. 6-4-2.
† Taitt. Brähmana. 2-8-9.
‡ Sankhya-kârikâ. 29.
§ Bri. Up. 5-1-5

SIVAGNANA SIDDHIAR
OF
ARUL NANTHI SIVA CHARIAR.

FIRST SUTRA.

Adikarana 2.

29. The pots are produced from the clay by the potter. Isa creates all forms, and these effects are produced each from its own material cause. Hear me, if you want to know where and how He creates these things.

30. It is not possible to understand His nature by anything we see in this world. As such, there is no one who could understand His Supreme Form. However, His action may be compared to that of Time, which brings about the origination, development, and destruction of the seven worlds.

31. As the words and ideas we had learnt become imbedded and arise out of our minds, as the different states of wakefulness, sleep &c. arise out of our life, so are the worlds evolved and ingathered by the Supreme God, who stands united and at the same time not united to this world.

32. If you ask why the souls and worlds are reproduced from Hara after resolution, this becomes necessary owing to existence of Anava Mala. The necessityf or its undergoing resolution in particular is to be found in the fact that the bodily energies become exhausted. The effects are destroyed and resolved into their cause. And Isa reproduces these forms as before.

NOTE.—The repeated births are necessary for the purpose of washing off the inherent Anava-mala, by gaining experience and knowledge and spirituality. The resolution is required as rest for the tired bodily energies, just as we take rest during night to recoup our energies for the task of to-morrow.

33. If you say God will undergo change, once we attribute to him powers of creation &c., No. In the presence of the sun, the lotus blooms, the crystal emits fire, and water evaporates.

The sun does not undergo change by any of these operations, and much less does God undergo any weariness or change.

34. If you ask, how it is that we ascribe all the powers to the one God, when all say that these three-powers are held by the three different Gods Brahma, Vishnu &c, our answer is that these Gods, by the

height of their Virtue receive the Agnja Sakti of the Lord at His bidding.

35. At the end of time, only One alone remains. If more than One, then it cannot be called Samharam. Hence Hara alone remains at the end, as He it is that destroys all. And as He is the support of all also, from Him also, do the worlds originate and develope again.

36. If you ask why God should exercise these powers, we may reply that this is His mere play. We may also point out that by these acts of Grace He makes the souls eat the fruits of their Karma and thus get rid of their Mala and attain Mukti.

NOTE.—What is meant by play here is, that the exercise of these powers is so easy for Him, as when we say, that it is a mere child's play for Him. It also means that these works are performed not for His own benefit.

37. Samharam is to give rest to the souls; Srushti is intended for the purpose of enabling souls to eat their Karma and thus to remove it. When souls eat their Karma, Sthithi is exercised. In Droupava the powers of mala are under check so that they may mature; He exercises His power of Anugraha when he frees us from our bonds. All these five functions are acts of His Grace. Revile not.

38. If you ask me to let you know whether the Creator has form or no form or has formless form, I may tell you that all these forms belong to the one and the same Supreme Being.

39. You object that when form is ascribed to God another creator like the one who creates our own bodies will be required, and that if God wills His body, the Jivas may be said to will their own bodies also. But we cannot assume any body we like. Our Supreme God assumes any wondrous form He thinks of, just as Siddhas do.

40. You say that if God takes form just as Siddhas do, then He becomes one like them. But these Siddhas exercise these powers only through the Grace of God. And if all forms are born of Maya, then the forms of God are also from Maya.

41. The bodies formed of Maya are obtained by the souls as they are covered by the Anava Mala. As the Supreme One is free from Maya and Anava Mala, and is pure absolute intelligence and imparts both knowledge and power to souls, His body cannot be formed of Maya but is formed out of His own Sakti.

42. If you say that even if His form is from Sakti, it must undergo change, and consequently God cannot be eternal and so God can only be formless. But He is not one of the six Atwas (formless material things). As you seem to be intelligent you had better hear further about the supreme nature of God.

NOTE,—There are formless objects which are limited and are formed of matter, and as such, there is nothing gained by simply calling God formless.

43. All objects of this world either have forms or no forms and some objects cannot change their form either. If, therefore, the Being of immeasurable intelligence is called formless we will only be ranking it with one of these objects.

44. He is not one of those objects which are subject to bonds and are free. He has neither beginning nor end He is infinite. As such, it cannot be postulated that my Supreme Father is only this and that, and that He cannot become this and that; and therefore any such postulate regarding the nature of the Supreme does not admit of any refutation either.

NOTE.—Compare the following stanzas from Devaram and Tiruvachakam.

(1) " மைப்படிந்த கண்ணாளுந் தானுங்கச்சி
மயானத்தான்வார் சடையான்மாசொன் றில்லான்
ஒப்புடைய னல்லனொருவ னல்ல
னோரூ ரனல்ல னோருவமையில்லி
யப்படிய னவ்வுருவ னவ் வண்ணத்த
னவனருளே கண்ணாகக் காண்பதல்லால்
இப்படிய னிவ் வுருவனிவ் வண்ணத்த
னிவனிறைவ னென்றெழுதிக் காட்டொணாதே.

" This Self is not attainable by explanation, nor yet by mental grasp, nor by hearing many times, by Him whom so He chooses—by him is He obtained. For him the Self its proper Form reveals." (Mund. 3-2-3.)

(2) " இன்பமுந் துன்பமு மில்லானே யுள்ளானே
அன்பருக் கன்பனே யாவை யுமாயல்லை யுமாஞ்
சோதியனே துன்னிருளே தோன்றாப் பெருமையனே
ஆதியனே யந்த நடுவாகி யல்லானே.

(3) " வேதமும் வேள்விய மாயினார்க்கு
மெய்ம்மையும் பொய்ம்மையு மாயினார்க்குச்
சோதியுமா யிருளாயினார்க்குத்
துன்பமுமா யின்ப மாயினார்க்குப்
பாதியுமாய் முற்று மாயினார்க்குப்
பந்தமு மாய்வீடு மாயினார்க்கு
ஆதியு மந்தமு மாயி னார்க்கு
ஆடப் பொற்சுண்ண மிடித்தும் நாமே.

45. As He does not possess the defect, as an object of perception, and, as he is possessed of both absolute Intelligence and Power, as he is not possessed of likes and dislikes, the *Ninmala* God can assume any form out of His Grace.

NOTE.—If an object, He will be capable of change and cannot be called self-dependent. If possessed of finite intelligence and power, He can only be limited. If possessed of likes and dislikes He will be subject to sin and sorrow. Not being possessed of these defects, none of the limitations which apply to human beings and matter apply to him at all.

c. f. (1) " அண்டமா ரிருளூடு கடந்தும்பர்
பண்டு போலுமோ ரொண்சுடரச்சுடர்
கண்டிங் காரறி வாரறி வார்க்கெலாம்
வெண்டிங்கட் கண்ணிவேதிய னென்பரே.

(2) " விரிகதிர் ஞாயிறல்லர் மதியல்லர் வேதவிதி
யல்லர் விண்ணு நிலனுந்
திரிதரு வாயு வல்லர்செறி தீயு மல்லர்
தெளி நீருமல்லர் தெரியில்
அரிதரு கண்ணியாளை யொருபாகமாக
வருள் காரணத்தில் வருவார்
எரியரவார மார்பரி மையா ருமல்லர்
இமைப் பாரு மல்ல ரிவரே.

46. If he did not, out of His Supreme Grace, assume forms, there would be nobody who could give out Vedas and A'gamas, and there would be nobody who could impart instruction, in the form of the Guru, to the Gods, men, and the residents of the nether regions; and so nobody can secure salvation.

c. f. (1) " மூவரு முப்பத்து மூவரு மற்றொழிந்த
தேவருங் காணாச் சிவபெருமான்—மாவேறி
வையகத்தே வந்திழிந்த வார்கழல்கள் வந்திக்க
மெய்யகத்தே யின்பமிகும். Tiruvachakam.

(2) " திருக்களிற்றுப்படியார் :—
ஆகமங்க ளெங்கே யறுசமயந் தானெங்கே
யோகங்க ளெங்கே யுணர்வெங்கே-பாகத்
தருள் வடிவுந் தானுமா யாண்டிலனே லந்தப்
பெருவடிவை யாரறிவார் பேசு.

47. His form is love; His attributes and knowledge are love; His five functions are love; His organs like arms and feet &c., and His ornaments like the crescent moon &c., are also love. These things are assumed by the Ninmala God, not for His own benefit but for the benefit of mankind.

c. f. " His Head is surely love; Joy His right wing, delight His left; Bliss is His self. Brahman where on He rests." Tait ii. 5.

48. None know that His form transcends the universe. None know that in His form, the universe rises from and merges. None know that He is the

life and the body of this universe. Ignorant of His Supreme form, they call Him as one of this world.

NOTE.—The author here refers to the vedic texts in which Rudra is called Viswadhika, Viswakarana, Viswantharyami, and Viswaswasoroopi.

49. They call Him as one of the Devas, but they know not that Siva is all the three gods, that half of His body is Uma, that neither Vishnu nor Brahma was able to fathom the great Jyothi. And they neither know not what Form arose out of this great Jyothi.

NOTE.—In this verse the author illustrates by Puranic episodes the vedic texts referred to by him above.

The episode of Brahma and Vishnu searching for His crown and feet and not finding them proves that God is Viswathika. The same story which further states that the three Gods appeared from the Great Jyothi shows that God is Viswakarana. The same story which further states that the great Jyothi subsided into the Linga form shows that God is Viswa Antharyâmi. The Puranic episode that Uma Haimavathi became half of His body shows that God is Viswa Soroopi.

That Siva is all the three Gods, as it is His Power that shines in them, and that yet He is different from them, in essence, and that the latter do also belong to the order of souls but to a very high order, is a position which has been very often explained in these pages. When the power of the Supreme God is manifest in the person and Body of the Tirumurties and other Higher Powers, Maheshwara and Sadasiva, the identity of the two is perceived, nay the Light of the supreme is alone perceived, owing to the tenuous Body of the Gods, just as we perceive only the light and light alone when looking at a chimney lamp from a distance and the brigh, chimney corresponding to the person and body of the Gods and Jivan muktas, is altogether imperceptible. Hence the defence of the worship of the three Gods; and of the Linga which Symbolises the fifth order of Gods, the Sadasivas, which is both of form and formless. When we remember how out of Sadasiva Tatwam the next tatwa of Maheshwara and the three lowest, Brahma, Vishnu and Rudra arise, the Linga Purana story that the Great Light (Jyotis), "that the Pure Light of Lights," the stainless, Partless Brahm, "placed within(man's) radiant highest Vesture" (Mund. Up. 3-1-9) From whom all words fall] back not reaching Him, mind as well (Tait. ii. 4) "சோதிமணி முடி சொல்லில் சொல்லிறந்து நின்ற தொன்மை ஆதிகுண மொன்றுமில்லான்) ; and "whose form stands not within vision's field, with eye no man beholds Him," (Katha. ii. 6-9) "That Bliss Supreme, that all description beggars (Kath. ii. 5. 14.) and who according to another Upanishad again is "not grasped by eye, nor yet by speech, nor by other powers nor by mere meditation, or even by bold deeds," (Mund. iii. 1. 8.), was not perceived by the greatest gods, who were waging war against each other out of Unmitigated Ahankara; and that when from that Light and "Life, which *flames* through all creation, Mund. iii. 1. 4), arose that *Mighty Sound* (Omkara) and subsided into the Visible form of the Linga, (Sadasiva Form) and that from this Linga again three Gods arose "as of that Brahman Supreme, it hath also been sung, in Him is the three" (Svet. i. 7), acquires full force and meaning and it cannot be relegated as merely a sectarian story. When Vaishnava writers freely quote from the Svetas vatara Upanishad for instance, and take the Rudra and Siva of these passages as denoting the Highest Brahman, and put within brackets "Narayana," next to such words, Saivas could not be doing violence to themselves or to any body when they take the Siva and Rudra of the Puranas (whose sole purpose is to explain and illustrate Vedic Meanings) as denoting the Supreme Brahman. And we heard a Vaishnava Pundit explain also that there are other *Vishnus* and *Narayanas* besides the Highest Narayana who with the Tirumurti Rudras are classed as Jivas. And it will stand to reason that the Jivas, Rudra, Narayana cannot surely comprehend either the Rudra, Para Brahm, or Narayana Parabrahm. We have ventured upon this explanation as one of our respected Vaishnava friends took objection to the story of Siva's feet and crown being searched as a blasphemous one. What a firm hold this story has got on the popular imagination, will be proved by the standing memorial of the Tiruvannamalai Temple, and the Kartigai Feast, and by Vaishnavas also celebrating this feast, in the same way they unwittingly celebrate, Dasara, Brahmotsava, and Kaman Pandigai. According to the Saivas, the Kartigai Feast, and Tiruvannamalai celebration, (celebrated in every other Temple also), and the raising of the great coloumn of Light refer to this Linga Purana episode; but what explanation Vaishnavas have for their Vishnu Kartigai, we are yet unable to discover, expect that they followed suit.

The story of the Ardhanareshwara formation clearly illustrates that Sivam and Sakti is one. Uma means literally light and wisdom, and this can never be identified with matter and darkness. This episode by the way gives also a refutation to the theory that 'Uma' Kali is Maya.

50. They know not that in His Bhoga Form He grants enjoyment to jivas. They know not that in His Yoga form He grants perfection to yogis. They know not that in His fearful form, He makes the souls to eat their Karma. They are fools without discernment who call him one of the gods.

51. By the One assuming different and inconsistent Forms, they know not that His Form is not of this world. They know not that all his different Forms are assumed for manifesting His different acts of Grace.

They know not that when He destroys He only destroys the sin of the world.

J. M. N.

(*To be continued.*)

TIRUMULAR'S TIRUMANTRA.

(*Continued from p. 179.*)

11. செல்கின்ற வாறறி சிவமுனி சித்தசன்
வெல்கின்ற ஞானத்து மிக்கோர் முனிவராய்ப்
பல்கின்ற தேவர் சுரர்நரர் தம்பா
லொல்கின்ற வான்வழி யூடுவந் தேனே.

The Knowing seers, Sivamuni and Siddhasan,
Adored by the invincible Munis wise,
And by hosts of Gods, celestials and men—
From them, my own descent I trace.

12. சித்தத்தி னுள்ளே சிறக்கின்ற நூல்களி
னுத்தம மாகவே யோதிய வேதத்தி
னொத்த வுடலையு முண்ணின்ற வுற்பத்தி
யத்த னெனக்கிங் கருளா லளித்ததே.

Of books, approved by our minds best,
The Vedas, the chief, as all will know ;
The body spoken by such Vedas as best,
My father graced me with here below.

13. நான்பெற்ற வின்பம் பெறுகவிவ் வையகம்
வான்பற்றி நின்ற மறைப்பொருள் சொல்லவு
மூன்பற்றி நின்ற வுணர்வுறு மந்திரந்
தான்பற்றப் பற்றத் தலைப்படுந் தானே.

The bliss I own let all the world obtain,
Imparting secrets of celestial nature,
The sacred Mantra, intended for mortal man,
Which grasping, grasping well, the bliss will mature.

14. பிறப்பிலி நாதனைப் பேர்நந்தி தன்னைச்
சிறப்பொடு வானவர் சென்றுகை கூப்பி
மறப்பிலா நெஞ்சினுண் மந்திரமாலை
யுறைப்பொடு கூடிநின் றோதலு மாமே.

The Lord Unborn, Nandi His name,
Him let the great in love worship
And not forget. And with a heart
Ever true, do Hymn the Mantra malika.

15. அங்கி மிகாமைவைத் தானுடல் வைத்தா
னெங்கு மிகாமைவைத் தானுல கேழையுந்
தங்கி மிகாமைவைத் தான்றமிழ் சாத்திரம்
பொங்கி மிகாமைவைத் தான்பொரு டானுமே.

He placed the fire in man within bounds ;
He placed it so everywhere :
He placed it so in the seven worlds ;
He too confined the truth in words spare.

Note, On the principle that when pearls are strewn before swine, they will trod them down to their own ruin.

16. அடிமுடி காண்பா ரயன்மா லிருவர்
படிகண் டிலர்மீண்டும் பார்மிசைக்கூடி
யடிகண் டிலனென் றச்சுதன் சொல்ல
முடிகண்டெ னென்றயன் பொய்மொழிந்தானே.

Searching for Feet and Crown, the gods
Found not ; and meeting on earth again,
Achuta confessed the Feet not found,
While Brahma lied he found the Crown.

17. பெற்றமு மானு மழுவும் பிரிவற்ற
தற்பரன் கற்பனை யாகுஞ் சராசரத்
தற்றமு நல்கி யடியேன் சிரத்தினி
னற்பத மும்மளித் தானெங்க ணந்தியே.

He rides the ox, and wields both deer and spear
Inseparable and yet beyond ; He taught
The Vanity of all we hold so dear
And placed on my head His gracious feet.

18. ஞேயத்தை ஞானத்தை ஞாதுருவத்தினை
மாயத்தை மாமாயை தன்னில் வரும்பரை
வாயத்தை யச்சிவன் றன்னை யகோசர
வீயத்தை முற்றும் விளங்கி யிட்டேனே.

The nature of Gneya, Gnana, Gnathuru
Of Maya, Mahamaya, and Parai,
The Self-create, and her Lord Hara
And His supremacy, all these I knew.

19. விளங்கிப் பரமாகு மெய்ஞ்ஞானச் சோதி
யளப்பில் பெருமைய னானந்த நந்தி
துளக்கறு மானந்தக் கூத்தன் சொற்போந்து
வளப்பிற் கயிலை வழியில் வந்தேனே.

I knew, and at the word of Nandi who
Is Lord Supreme, and Light and Wisdom
Of Infinite Bliss and unsullied Love.
Came I in the line of Kailasa Guru.

20 நந்தியருளாலே மூலனை நாடிப்பின்
னந்தி யருளாலே சதாசிவ னாயினே
னந்தி யருளாலே மெய்ஞ்ஞானத்து நண்ணினே
னந்தி யருளாலே நானிருந்தேனே.

By Nandi's Grace, I entered Mula's frame ;
By Nandi's grace I Sadasiva attained ;
By Nandi's grace, to me True Wisdom came ;
By Nandi's grace, I in Yoga ever remained.

21. இருக்கி லிருக்கு மெண்ணிலி கோடி
யருக்கின்ற மூலத்து ளங்கே யிருக்கு
மருக்கனுஞ் சோமனு மாரழல் வீச
வுருக்கி யுரோம மொளிவிடுந் தானே.

The countless Richs are contained in one Mantra,
Wherein, the Sun and Moon if made to play
Round and inflame this Sacred Fire ultra,
The Yogi's frame, with a colour bright, will glow.

22 பிதற்றுகின் றேனென்றும் பேர்நந்தி தன்னை
யியற்றுவ னெஞ்சத் திரவும் பகலும்
முயற்றுவ னேங்கொளி வண்ணனெம் மானை
யியற்றிகழ் சோதி யிறைவனு மாமே.

Ever babbling am I about my Loving Lord ;
In my own heart I praise Him day and night ;
On Him, the effulgent Light and my own God ;
I meditate and become at once the self same Light.

J. M. N.

(*To be continued.*)

THAYUMANAVAR'S POEMS.

(*Continued from page 33.*)

ஐவ ரென்றபுல வேடர் கொட்டம
டங்க மர்க்கடவன் முட்டியாய்
அடவி நின்றுமலை யருகி னின்றுசரு
சாதி தின்றுபனி வெயிலி னால்
மெய்வ ருந்ததவ மில்லை நற்சரியை
கிரியை யோகமெனு மூன்றதாய்
மேவு கின்ற சவுபான நன்னெறி
விரும்ப வில்லை யுலகத்திலே
பொய்மு டங்குதொழில் யாத தற்குநல
சாரதித்தொழி னடத்திடும்
புத்தி யூகமறி வற்ற மூடமிவை
பொரு ளெனக்கருது மருளன்யான்
தெய்வ நல்லருள் படைத்த வன்பரொடு
சேர வுங்கருணை கூர்வையோ
தெரிவதற் கரிய பிர மேயமல
சிற்சு கோதய விலாசமே. (௧௨௫)

125. O Chithànanda Siva of all-gracious lîla! O the Pure unknowable Parabrahmam! I have not yet contracted the austere habit of firmness of mind as good as a monkey's grasp to rest myself in the forest or by the sides of the mountains and suffer the hardship of living on dry leaves &c. and undergoing severe heat and cold; and so to put down the sullen obstinacy of my five senses and elude their fierce pursuit. Nor have I impressed myself with the absolute necessity of the gradational steps of *Siva*-Sariya, *Siva*-Kiriya and *Siva*-Yoga.* I find in me a bewildered intellect to think that the right understanding and moral reasoning, the surest guide in the right conduct of this life, as well as the blind silence† are meant to be administered in furtherance of dishonest purposes. O The All gracious, do Thou grant me the favour that I might seek the company of Thy beloved devotees.‡

* The saint establishes that *siva*-sariya *siva*-kiriya and *siva*-yoga are absolutely necessary for a man seeking emancipation until and up to the discarding of this body or the cessation of evolution. நன்னெறி is the word used in the text. It means 'the good path'—the contemplation of the Parabrahmam as the Supreme Siva (Sivoham) being the highest stage.

† The reference is to the school of idealists who take the spiritual Summum Bonum to be the mere 'sitting dumb' without the Gneyam (the Goal), of course regardless of the mundane concerns and of *self* (soul). It may be also said that hypocritic devotees are alluded to.

‡ *c. f.* 12th Sutra S. Botham.

ஏக மானவுரு வான நீயருளி
னால னேகவுரு வாகியே
எந்த நாளகில கோடி சிர்ஷ்டிசெய
விசையு நாள்வரைய நாண்முத
லாக நாளது வரைக்கு முன்னடிமை
கூடவேசனன மானதோ
அநந்த முண்டுநல சனன மீதிசனு
னறிய வேண்டுவன வறியலாம்
மோகமாதிதரு பாசமானதை
யறிந்து விட்டேனையு மெனையுமே
முழுது ணர்ந்துபர மான வின்பவெள
மூழ்க வேண்டுமிது வின்றியே
தேக மேநழுவி னானு மோநழுவின்
பின்னை யுய்யும்வகை யுள்ளதோ
தெரிவ தற்சரிய பிரம மேயமல
சிற்சு கோதய விலாசமே. (௧௨௬)

126. O Chithananda Siva of all gracious lîla! O The Pure unknowable Parabrahmam!

From that day of Thy creation of these myriads of Andas or worlds—that is, the day on which Thou, the Universal Life-Principle* of a unique Kind of Light, didst, by Thy Grace, will to evolve and manifest the names and forms of this universe from its primordial invisible state in Thee—from that day to this, as Thy dependent slave I have undergone countless deaths and births. The present human birth† must be, of course, the best of them; for, it will help me over to get at the very aims‡ of this life; so that, before my death, I should fulfil its mundane terms by suffering and quitting the wicked gunas moga &c, and, after a complete discrimination of myself from Thee, become absorbed in the Supremest Bliss of advaita union with Thee If, on the other hand, I should

* The Parama-siva may be called a common world—soul wherein man and nature meet and mingle. C. F. Byron "Pantheism in its *purer* form is practically identical with *animism*. It is also in accord with the Platonic and Pythogorean belief that all the movements and *forces* of the world are the result of a World-Soul or ANIMA-MUNDI—He is the Essential Deity—THE SOUL OF ALL THAT IS. C. F. the Tamil Upanishad "எவையு முதல்வனுக்குடம்பு" (all that is is the body of the Lord) contained in the famous verse of the Holy Work 'Siva-darma-Vicharam'.

'தேகமேபிரமம இந்த்ரியம்பிரமம் திகழ்கரணங்களேபிரமம்
மோகமார்சீவன் பிரமமென்றெவையு முதல்வனுக்குடம்பெனுமுறையா
லாகமவேதமடங்கலுங் கூறும் ஆங்கதனுண்மை தேர்ந்தறியார்
கூகைபோற்கத்தி சிவனைப்பரமாய்க்கொண் டகங்கொண்டயர்வரே."

[Both Vada and Agama do say that, *because all that is may be said to be the body of the Supereme Lord* (*Brahm*), the senses are the Brahm, the *Karanas* (internal senses) are the Brahm, and the soul or jiva conditioned is the Brahm. It is only those that do not understand this truth will cry out like an owl that jiva (soul or pasu or atma) is the Supreme Siva or Brahm (who is the indwelling Spirit of the universes) and thus meet with a failure.]

† C. F. "Man is the evolution of the mollusc"---Darwin.

‡ C. F. 41st verse.

lose this corporeal state sooner than that, O my Lord, I have no other alternative for my salvation *

நியம லக்ஷணமு மியமு லக்ஷணமு
மாசன நாதிவித பேதமும்
நெடிது ணர்ந்திதய பத்ம பீடமிசை
நன்றி லங்குபஜ பாநலத்
தியல றிந்தவளர் மூல குண்டலியெ
யினிதி றைஞ்சியவ ளருளினால்
எல்லை யற்றுவளர் சோதி மூலவனை
லெஞ்சண் மோனமறு முறையிலே
வயமி சுந்தவரு மமிர்த மண்டல
மதிக்கு ளேமதியை வைத்துநான்
வாய்ம டுத்தமிர்த வாரி யைப்பருகி
மன்னு மாரமிர்த வடிவமாய்ச்
செயமி குந்தவரு சித்த யோகநிலை
பெற்று ஞானநெறி யடைவனோ
தெரிவ தற்கரிய பிரம மேயமல
சிற்சு கோதய விலாசமே. (௧௨௭)

127. O Chithananda Siva of all gracious lîla! The Pure unknowable Parabrahmam!

Can I ever attain the highest state of Thy Gnana through the successful Yoga practice of the Divine Siddhas?† They would become sunk in the vast sweetness of the ambrosia in their Soma's orb, which is caused by the heat of devout meditation at their hearts brought to bear upon the boundless blaze of the innermost fire ‡ produced by the all graciousness of the kundalin,§ in the doing of the Siva Raga yoga † of *Yama Niyama, A'sana,* cf.

R. SHUNMUGA MUDALIAR,

(*To be continued.*)

* Vide notes to 48th verse.

C. F. Notes to verses 60, 87, 88, 89, 100, 106 & 108.

*This *mayaic* body is the vessel, as it were, given us by the Providence of God, willed out of the matter, *maya*. Without the vessel we cannot cross the ocean of life. Therefore it is our duty to preserve this vessel (body) in tact until we cross the said ocean-life and reach the moksha of eternal Peace and Bliss.

† Siddhas are the typical ascetics described in the preceeding ten verses 57 to 66.

‡ Vide note to '*samana*' under 36th verse.

§ Kundalin. The allusion is to the Siva—Sakti acting upon the Sudda maya (the last essence of matter).

‖ Siva Raja Yoga of eight parts is alluded to as the sole mode of practising Yoga in the best successful manner. The saint as a successful Yogin often exults himself in describing the details of this Yoga—practice which is of course only *completely enjoyable.* Vide notes to 61st verse.

¶ *A'sana* or *a'thana* means 'seat or posture.' There are nine kinds of seats prescribed and the most convenient one for a practiser in Yoga (not without a guru!) may be chosen out of them. They are (1) 'சுவத்திகம்' (suvathikam) is to pass the soles of feet betwixt the thigh and the knee and sit erect. (2) 'கோமுகம்' (Komugam) is to place the legs crossways under the thighs and to sit so, holding the thick toes with the hands; (3) 'பதுமம்' (Padmam) is to place the soles of feet crossways *over* both the thighs (4) வீரம் (Veeram) is to pass the left leg on the right thigh and sit erect (5) கேசரி (Kesari) is to place the legs below the membrum virile in contact with the vital artery lying between the anus and the pudenda and to sit seeing towards the nose after placing the elbows on the knees and letting the fingers staight up. (6) பத்திரம் (Pathiram) is to sit as in seat No. 5 except that both the legs should be held with the hands. (7) முத்தம் (muttam) is to press the said vital artery with the left foot and cause the right foot to press against the left placed as above and so to remain motionless. (8) மயூரம் (Mayooram) is to press the two elbows against the navel and so to rest the body on the hands placed on the ground with the legs stretched straight behind and the head erect and (9) 'சுகம்' (Sukam) is the seat suiting the convenience and advantage of the practiser. The practiser will do well, if fit, to learn the suitable seat or posture from his preceptor or initiator (Guru). Still the above are explained to serve as an incentive though not a complete guide to Gnana Sadana.

SERMONS IN STONES.

1. "May Kamamardana the cause of existence, and continuance and destruction, (Himself) uncaused be (propetious) to the boundless desires of the world.

2. "May he who is united with Umâ, (Himself) without illusion, (yet) of multiform illusion, without attributes, the destroyer of evil dispositions, of incorruptible wealth, the Lord of Kubera, be counted excellent.

3. "May that deity (Siva) protect us all, who is the seat of prosperity, and by whose means Kailâsa disappeared and descended to Pâtâla, yielding by its weight, which he caused on account of its being with (supported by) the ten-faced (Râvana).

4. "May he who bears Siva in his mind engrossed by devotion, and the earth on his shoulders, with as much ease as if it were an ornament, long prevail.

5. "By that king of satisfied wishes with crowds of conquered enemies, who is known by the name of Panajaya stambha, this building was made.

6. "May that fear-inspiring, good-giving, desire-destroying Siva, to whom the earth, space, moon, fire, the sun, &c., are a body, be victorious.

7. "The good-faced among nations (the beauty of the world) sprung from a mother bringing forth heroes, remains without doubt in a place of lotuses, full of sacred waters, and is adorned with all sorts of precious stones.

8. and 9. "Siva the beautiful, sits in the broad lake Siras, which teems with (is a mine of) lotuses, resembling variegated gems, and is full of water for sprinkling the fortunate and much loved Kâmarâju who puts down the pride of his enemies, who is the source (receptacle) of glory, and is earnest in worshipping Sivas.

10. "He (Kamaraja) who dwells on the heads of Kings, caused this temple of Siva, which resembles the temple on Kailasa, to be erected for the happiness of the earth."

(From the inscription in the Ganesa Pagoda at Mamallaipuri. (Seven Pagodas). Age. Before 500 A. D.)

THE

LIGHT OF TRUTH

OR

Siddhanta Deepika.

MADRAS, AUGUST 1899.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.*

The Student of Sanskrit or of Philosophy had till now to look for any information concerning Indian Philosophy either in the original Sanskrit Texts themselves, in the stray or disconnected essays scattered through the works of Wilson, Colebrooke, or Goldstücker, or in Duesson's Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie[1] which appeals perhaps to a different public and in which the evolution and historical character of Indian Philosophy cannot in the nature of things occupy more than a subsidiary place. Between the voluminous though excellent essays of a few Sanskritists on one or two departments of Indian Philosophic Thought on the one hand, and the extremely sketchy and sometimes positively mischievous accounts of the whole range of Indian Philosophy in such books as Monier Williams' "Brahminism and Hinduism" and "Indian Wisdom," and Weber's "History of Indian Literature," on the other, it has always been an insuperable trouble to the Student of Indian Philosophy that he could not refer with ease for any information on branches of Indian Philosophy to an authoritative book that would be at once concise and exhaustive, adequate in treatment, clear and sympathetic in exposition. Such an ideal book was being felt as a sorry want ever since the impulse given to the study of Sanskrit Philosophy by the publication of Duesson's "Elements of Metaphysics," and Max Müller's "Three lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy." This want we might boldly say has in a way been remedied by the publication of Prof. Max Müller's "Indian Philosophy" of which this article is a review. Prof. Max Müller, that Nestor among Sanskritists now living, has set himself, in the present book, to the work of showing the evolution of the main lines of Indian Philosophic thought as presented to us in the six systems of Indian Philosophy, and the historical growth and collateral developments of some schools of thought side by side with one another as in the case of the Vedanta and theSankhya. We will see therefore that to the author who is able to impose upon himself such a weighty task, a sound linguistic training is as much essential as a deep acquaintance with the Schools of modern and ancient European Thought. If we may judge from his previous works, as a scholar that could breathe with perfect ease and calmness in an atmosphere that is so rarified as that of Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kant[2] and Descartes, as a student that has studied with abiding attention all the intricate problems connected with the growth and development of every important religion under the Sun, as a navigator that can steer with a composure that comes only of an infallible skill in the art, all the boisterous seas of early Indian Philosophy, and more than all as an expounder that is in good sympathy with whatever he gives an account of, that would speak as a strong adherent would do, and never distort, caricature, colour, or twist any system he is speaking about, Max Müller's competency for this truly responsible work should raise him above others in the English-knowing world. It is therefore not surprising that this book of Max Müller's should have been looked forward to with expectation for some time. It should be in the hands of all students of Indian Philosophy who would be sure to welcome the book now that it appears. There is a good index at the end of the volume though here and there there are flagrant omissions, and the whole book is attractively got up. The printing is clear and the price is not very moderate. In the body of the book there are many mistakes which indeed should be a surprising feature to students accustomed to Max Müller's previous works. That Max Müller, whose immense use as a Vedic scholar and a student of the World's philosophies and religions to the world of letters can be best measured by the turn that Sanskrit studies have taken in European Universities,[3] and who would be the last man to spare any troubles on behalf of a book which should mark an era in the study of Indian Philosophy just as his "History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature," in Vedic studies[3] and on the correctness of, and sound presentation in which so much depends, should complain of the weakness of his old age, and ask forgiveness at the hands of his readers for mistakes that might have escaped his notice, really overcomes us with a feeling of sadness and regret as we open the book and remember that Mr. A. E. Gough, despite his kindness in reading a revise of Max Müller's book, has not been equal to the task which Max Müller, alone and unassisted, in his vigorous days, was doing as perfectly as any proficient in proof-

* The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. By The Right Hon. F. Max Müller, K. M. Longmans Green and Co. 39 Paternoster Row, London. 1899. 8vo. Pp. xxvii. and 618. Price 18 Shillings.

1 As an introduction to this book is affixed a translation of Madhusûdana Saraswati's Prasthana Bheda, a very valuable resumé of Indian systems of Philosophy.

2 See Kant's Critique of Pure Reason translated by Max Müller with an introduction by Ludwig Noiré. Macmillan and Co.

3 Vide H. G. Bühler's speech in the Ninth international Congress of Orientalists held in 1892.

examining. It has always been a matter of very rare curiosity for one to be able to find even slight topogrophical misprints, much less mistakes of fact in the professor's books. Unfortunately our book has a little too much of errors of both descriptions, as compared with his previous works. The only reparation we have for all this, and it is more than a reparation, is his own touching words in the preface (p. XXI) "a man of seventy-six has neither the eyes nor the memory which he had at twenty-six, and he may be allowed to appeal to younger men for such help as he himself in his younger days has often and gladly lent to his Guru and fellow labourers."[4] We will advert to all such mistakes in the course of our review. Prof. Max Muller after sketching in the preface the backbone of the Indian Philosophies, so to speak, namely the Advaitism of Sankara, and Kapila's creed, and justly vindicating the right view each maintains from its own standpoint, speaks about the importance of the study of Indian philosophy:—"And if hitherto no one would have called himself a philosopher who had not read and studied the works of Plato and Aristotle, of DesCartes and Spinoza, of Locke, Hume, and Kant in the original, I hope that the time will come when no one will claim that name who is not acquinted at least with the two prominent systems of ancient Indian Philosophy, the Vedanta and the Sânkhya" (p. XVII). Regarding the six main systems he has dwelt on, and their prominent apostles, he has been very careful to give a complete view and to represent them as a follower himself would. And thus he says "If we want our friends to love our friends, we do not give a full account of their qualities but we dwell on one or two of the strong points of their character. This is what I have tried to do for my old friends, Badarayana, Kapila and the rest" (p. XVIII) and elsewhere says again "It is in the Walhalla of real philosophers that I claim a place of honour for the representatives of the Vedanta and the Sankhya" (p. XVII). Whatever seemed in the exposition of a system not likely to appeal to European tastes or sympathies, that, he says, he has sedulously avoided, though we do not know if in a book of such magnitude, claiming to traverse the ground of the whole philosophic literature existing in India, this would be a proceeding not prejudicial to the interests of Sanskrit Scholarship. And there are other blemishes also especially in the treatment of the later devolopments of each cardinal system, to which we will direct the attention of the reader when we take chapter after chapter for review. Professor Max Muller gives as his opinion, and in this he echoes the views of that out and out, radical, Sankhyan expositor[5] of the Vedanta of the sixteenth century, Vignanabhikshu, whom the most keen-witted of pundits of the present day will not approach without tremor and a sense of diffidence, that there is no doubt there has been ever from the beginning of philosophical thought in India extending to the remotest past, a a common amount of floating parcels of plastid philosophic matter which every ingenious thinker was ready to shape as he will and add them as bricks to the edifice he reared. This idea is what one should have expected from Max Müller after his extensive study ranging over the whole realm of Indian Philosophy, and he expresses it in a markedly fine style, "The longer I have studied the various systems, the more have I become impressed with the view taken by Vignana Bhikshu and others, that there is behind the variety of the six systems, a common fund of what may be called national or popular philosophy, a large Manasa lake of Philosophical thought and language, far away in the distant North, and in the distant Past, from which each thinker was allowed to draw for his own purposes." (p. XVIII) The truth of this can well be brought home to the mind of any one who wishes to think seriously, by taking into consideration the four primordial elements or rather the basic pillars of primary philosophic efforts in India, as shadowed forth by the principal and undoubtedly archaic Upanishads, in the pregnant terms Atman and Brahman, Prakriti and Purusha, how out of these four main lines of ideas, two important schools evolved, the Sankhya and the Vedanta as represented in Badarayana[6] and Kapila, and how by squaring, cubing and halving each respectively or by combining and permuting both in various proportions, with some existing terms deleted and new ones added, was brought into existence the various other schools of philosophic activity adorning the Sûtra and Purâna, nay even still later periods, such as Sankara's unflinching Monism, Ramanuja's Visishtadwaitism,[7] Vidyaranya's and Vachaspathi Misra's graft of a little Sankhya on Sankara's Monism and Vignana Bhikshu's clever amalgam of Sankya and Vedanta which borders upon that of Ramanuja, the

[4] For the same strain of moving complaint, see also Max Muller's Phychological Religion. New issue 1898. Preface p. XVI.

[5] His commentary on the Vedanta Sutras is now being translated by Ganganath Jha. M. A.

[6] How much alloy of Kapila he meant to possess is yet open to question. Sankara his expounder is a consistant adherent to the Upanishad doctrines. He heads the latest recension of a school represented by Gaudapada and others. Which of the two, Ramanuja or Sankara, pourtrays Badarayana correctly cannot be settled satisfactorily in the absence of any other work of Badarayana venting his views. If consistent logic, sharp intellection and a faithful, sensible and unswerving interpretation of the Upanishads are taken into consideration, Sankara indeed is Ramanuja's superior. No doubt the Upanishads are older than the Brahma Sutras and represent as such an earlier view. Vide Thibaut's introduction to the Sariraka Bhashya of Sankara. *Sacred Books of the East.*

[7] As regards the Chit, Achit, and Icwara (Padarthatritayam) and the Sankhyan complexion of his cult, see Vedantatattvasara of Ramanuja.

Pâcupatha system which is little else but Ramanuja inoculated with a goodly dose of Sankhya, not to speak of Yoga, as given to us in Patanjali's theism, Vaiseshika, Nyaya and a mixture of the two latter, Nyaya-Vaiseshika and the later modern developments therefrom. But it is all the same for a scientific student of philosophy to say, that all the existing systems have emanated or developed from a beginning of complex fancies in the minds of the ancient Hindus regarding the aetiology and eschatology of things, sometimes by slow growths in independent directions, and often by an interblending and intertwining of branches with new suckers shooting forth from the resultant tangle, as to think, as Vignana Bhikshu[8] suggests in a spirit of Orthodox piety or enlightened liberalism, whichever it may be, that all the various philosophies have behind them a common fund of truth, and that Nyaya, Vaiseshika, Yoga, Sankhya and Vedanta are but steps in the ladder of spiritual progress both in a cosmic and psychic sense [viz. the various stages reached in the objective world of intellectual efforts by philosophers who formulated independent systems corresponded with stages or milestones in the subjective growth of the Soul in each human individual], Nyaya indicating the lowest rung while Vedanta the highest. Vignana Bhikshu's view may be tersly epigrammatised, if we parody Prof. Haeckel's well-known biogenetic law, and understand by his phylogeny, the summary of the different distinct mental steps arrived at by various philosophies in the Indian philosophic world, as a Monad's spiritual ontogeny is recapitulated by World's phylogeny or Phylogeny reflects Ontogeny. In any case after looking into the unique structure of every Indian philosophic dogma, and the relations that link it with every other system living near it, we must conclude that there has been a persisting course of evolution of thought through centuries, much the same as the *parinama*[9] of Icwara postulated by Ramanuja. Prof. Max Muller deplores towards the end of the preface the neglect into which the study of some philosophies such as Yoga have fallen and hence adds most feelingly[10] "It is feared, however, that even this small remnant of philosophical learning will vanish in one or two generations, as the youths of the present day, even if belonging to orthodox Brahminic families, do not take to these studies as there is no encouragement" (p. XX) and yet he rejoices that there are modern Hindus now rising who "after studying the history of European Philosophy, have devoted themselves to the honourable task of making their own national philosophy better known to the world at large." In this connection after pointing out that "a mixing up of philosophical with religious and theosophic propaganda, inevitable as it is said to be in India, is always dangerous," he enumerates a number of Journals as being instrumental in guiding people aright and in deterring them from mixing up philosophical creed with sectarian religious littlenesses, and among which "The Light of Truth" is brought in as one. I shall quote the sentence itself, "But such Journals as the *Pundit*, the *Brahmavádin*, *the Light of Truth*, and lately the Journal of *the Buddhist Text Society*, have been doing most valuable service" and further on he continues referring to Texts and Translations and to the necessity of bringing to light the non-Sanskrit philosophical literature that exists in the South of India, in such rapturous terms, "What we want are Texts and Translations and any information that can throw light on the chronology of Indian Philosophy. Nor should their labour be restricted to Sanskrit Texts. In the South of India there exists a philosophical literature which, though it may show clear traces of Sanskrit influence, contains also original indigenous elements[11] of great beauty and of great importance for historical purposes. Unfortunately few scholars only have taken up, as yet, the study of the Dravidian languages and literature, but young students who complain that there is nothing left to do in Sanskrit Literature, would, I believe, find their labours amply rewarded in that field" (pp. XX-XXI). These are the words in which he is referring to the study of indigenous Tamil works on Philosophy, Literature and what not, and no need that we should emphasise too strongly if South India and its native literary activity, have ever been absent from his thoughts when thinking of an historical evolution of Indian Philosophies, extant and extinct. The only other reference he makes to the *Siddhanta Deepika* is in the chapter on the Mimamsa, where, in the course of our review, we will direct appropriately the reader's attention to it.

The book is divided into nine chapters. The first or the introductory chapter deals with the physical and other material environments in which the Hindus found themselves placed that helped a good deal for such a rich harvest of philosophic speculations in India, and with the natural facilities afforded by physical features and the want of keen competition for the necessaries of life among the Hindus, tending to stimulate them to think seriously about Soul and God, the subjectivation of the Human Individual and the objectivity of the puzzling Kosmos. The second chapter gives an account of the Vedas and the Vedic gods, and seeks to fathom in their inmost depths for the latent springs of the future philosophical fermentation of India and to explain how the potential germs imbedded in

8 Vide Sankhya Pravachana Bhashya, and for an almost similar view see Annie Besant. Four Great Religions of the World.

9 See Madhava's Sarvadarsana Sangraha.

10 Compare also his pupil Kielhorn's remarks in the introduction to Nagoji Bhatta's Paribhashendusékhara.

11 See *inter alia* my communication, "The University and the Vernaculars." *The Madras Mail.* March 13th 1897.

them blossomed up into the vague philosophic surmises of the Upanishad epoch and into the systematised philosophical systems of the Sutra period. This brings us to the third chapter entitled "The systems of Philosophy" where in the main he endeavours to find out the common groundwork of the six main systems of Philosophy and to point to the necessity of a mnemonic literature being present in the absence of writing, when pupils originally learnt the respective systems in retired A'sramas in forests by getting by rote a collection of well-arranged aphorisms constructed with due reference to minimise the labour of memory, supplemented by oral running commentaries from their preceptors. Chapter IV gives an excellent summary of the Uttaramimamsa of Badarayana as conceived and explained by Sankara, with a few remarks on Ramanuja's system. Chapter V deals with the Purvamimamsa whose old name is Nyaya, since in it was originally devoloped those elements of Indian Logic, which migrated in succession to Gotama's Nyaya system, Badarayana's creed in the hands of its later adherents, and up to the Nadiya recension of the Nyaya school disfiguring it to such a length that it lost sight of the original philosophic aim it set before itself and covered itself with a thick mist of verbal acrobatism or word-jugglery. Or perhaps as Max Muller thinks, the particular materials which, to the exclusion of others, the Purvamimamsa drew from the common fund of philosophical store were also drawn upon by various other schools as necessity arose. In Chap. VI he gives an account of the Sankhya, prefacing it with a short summary of the later Vedantic devolopments with which the Sankhya was freely mixed. Chap. VII has for its subject "Yoga and Sankhya," discusses the relation between these two, and ends with an analysis of the Yoga and the bearing of the Sankhya on it. In Chap. VIII Nyaya and Vaiseshika are touched upon, with a fairly good account of the Nyaya in its later stages, and an excellent resumé of the Indian Logic. The indissolubleties between the Nyaya and the Vaiseshika are very well sketched. In Chap. IX which is the last chapter, the Vaiseshika as an independant system is taken into consideration, and the Indian atomic philosophy and the so called "qualities" postulated by Kanáda are examined. The closing section gives a thoughtful comparative view of all the six systems, with the points of contrast between them and showing the underlying unity of conception running through them though sometimes imbedded far below the surface. Whatever we may to have to say as regards the completeness or anything like exhaustiveness in the treatment of the various systems adopted in the present work, one cannot but admire the almost Indian fashion in which the philosophies are presented to the readers without any perversion, distortion, or colouring and the broad-minded sympathy and extreme reverence for productions of the Past evidenced in his exposition of the Indian systems. More than all, not content with explaining the philosophy with the skill and clearness of a true philosopher, the Professor on every occasion is anxious to trace the primary thoughts, difficulties and aspirations that surged within the breasts of Kapila, Badarayana and the rest, which might have ended in the six grand systems of philosophy as the final solutions of problems presenting themselves to those thinkers in this inexplicable drama of life. Prof. Max Muller wants to find beneath the apparently cold philosophies of Kapila and Badarayana which were evidently the culminating upshot of a whole period or a series of periods of philosophic incubation, the living motives, the way out of human troubles, losses or despondency and the incipient thoughts, conceived by those thinking people in a purely resigned spirit hankering after the Truth. He creates sympathies in us to like our old philosophers, since the same problems which assail us in thinking moments, confronted them, and the possible solutions that struck them as ways out of the difficulty they have handed down to posterity. And therefore they were all human from top to toe and meant these as a method of consoling reflection when we open our eyes to the gordian knot of this world presented to our senses.

There is nothing striking in the Introductory chapter for people that have been already used to Max Muller's other works[1 2], especially his four courses of Gifford lectures on Natural, Physical, Anthropological and Psychological Religion, and his Hibbert lectures on the Religions of India, for, in it we get only a connected presentation of his early views appertaining to the growth of philosophical thoughts in India almost necessitated by its ancient geographic and economic conditions. The peace and plenty which people in India enjoyed in olden times coupled with a prodigal supply of food which Nature lavished without much labour on the part of the inhabitants, gave them little care to mind the problems of everyday wants and left them nothing whatever of the modern heat of politics, and thus surrounded as they were by a luxuriant vegetation, tropical groves and pleasant streams, Nature quickened their minds to a multitude of speculations about the mystery, variety and unity of the visible Kosmos, which culminated after numberless generations in the solid systems of philosophy, the glory of the Indian peoples. That this was so, is evident when we look into the internal historical evidences supplied by the antecedent conditions that gave birth to Buddhism, the intellectual life in ancient India as reflected in the Swetaswatara, Kaushitaki and other Upanishads, and the post-Buddhistic history given us in the Tripitaka, Brahmajalasutta and the like. The assistance of the Mahabharata also may be called in here, as affording us a splendid glimpse of the domestic life lead by the Hindus in those hoary days. More than all, the accounts of Megasthenes, the ambassador of

1 2 Vide also Max Muller's History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, Chap. IV and his "India, what can it teach us?"

மகாமகோபாத்தியாய
டாக்டர். உ. வே. சாமிநாதையர்
நூல் நிலையம்,
சென்னை-600090.

Seleucus Nicator at the court of Chandragupta, and of Hiouen-thsang, the Chinese pilgrim who visited India at what may be called the Renaissance period of Sanskrit Literature, give us their own share of evidence as to the philosophic and almost unpolitical atmosphere in which the people of ancient India breathed. Thus Prof. Max Muller after summing up all the evidence has to say, "As far back as we can trace the history of thought in India, from the time of king Harsha and the Buddhist pilgrims back to the descriptions found in the Mahabharata, the testimonies of the Greek invaders, the minute accounts of the Buddhists in their Tripitaka, and in the end the Upanishads themselves, and the hymns of the Veda, we are met everywhere by the same picture, a society in which spiritual interests predominate and throw all material interests into the shade, a world of thinkers, a nation of philosophers" (p. 42).

In the second chapter an account of the Vedas is given as the literary document in which philosophy had not as yet been differentiated from religion, or at least, in the Samhita portion of which even a forecast is hardly possible of the apparent distinction between religion and philosophy inaugurated imperceptibly in the Upanishads and reaching its noonday vigour in the Sutra period. The various steps by which the chaos of Vedic philosophy was reduced to the cosmos of the Sutra-period Schools are lucidly sketched, with philological notes on various words found in the Vedas that became in aftertimes, the key-stones of various philosophic systems. The syncretism and the henotheism of the Samhitas and the Brahmanas, as well as the polytheistic tendencies found in the earlier portions of some of the Rig-Vedic hymns, are succeeded by the pantheism and monotheism of the Upanishads, nay, in some instances, by utterances pointing to a positive belief in monism. When speaking about the three classes of Vedic gods, of the sky, of the mid-air and of the earth, he alludes to the curious fact of the absence of anything like Star-worship in India to any prominent extent, and then goes on "A few of the stars only, such as were connected with human affairs, determining certain seasons, and marking the time of rain (Hyades), the return of calmer weather (Pleiades), or the time for mowing (Krittikas), were noticed and named, but they never rose to the rank of the high gods." (p. 49) Professor Max Muller is evidently making here an erroneous distinction between the Pleiades and the Krittikas which both, on the other hand, refer to the same widely extended groups.[13] The distinction between syncretism and henotheism which puzzled and confounded Prof. Weber is well worth noting. Several gods in the Vedas owing to their position in Nature were seen to perform the same acts, and hence a Vedic poet might well take upon himself to say that Agni acted not only with Indra or Savitri but that in certain of his duties Agni was Indra and was Savitri. The number of dual and triple gods that were thus addressed as working in unison for the time will be brought within the phase of worship known as syncretism and it is to be carefully distinguished from henotheism which addresses for the moment either Indra or Agni or Varuna as the only God in existence with an entire forgetfulness of all other gods. And this distinction is very interesting to us since it was a *pons asinorum* to Prof. Weber in the study of comparative mythology, and he actually mistook the syncretism of Prof. Max Muller for his henotheism, and began blaming him on that account. In a way therefore we could see how the syncretism of the Vedic poets should lead to the later monotheistic theology, and the henotheistic phase to monistic philosophy which in the hands of Sankara rose to be a wonderful engine of influence. He points to two suktas from the Rig Veda,[14] and finds in the first of them the germs of monotheism and in the second of Adwaitism. He also translates for us "The Hymn to the Unknown God" from the Rig Veda, which though other scholars believe was intended for the individualised god, Prajapati, Max Muller maintains to be the expression of a yearning after one supreme Deity, who had made Heaven and Earth, the Sea, and all that in them is. This is one of the very few hymns in the Rig Veda pointing in a decided manner to the thirst of the Indian mind after a monotheistic conception to start with. And from the monotheistic Prajapati sprang conceptions of Brahman (neut), unmanifested and absolute, and Brahma (masc) manifested and phenomenal, and an emanation from *Nirgunam Brahman*, useful from a Vyâvahâric point of view for the popular worship of minds full of overflowing devotion towards a "Father in Heaven." The Nâsadîya hymn of the Rig Veda gives us a clue to the mind of the Vedic poet who constantly oscillated between a personal and impersonal or rather a superpersonal cause from whence the Universe emanated. The term तदेकं That One, was applied to the Deity as abolishing ideas connected with the male or female sex, with a personal and proper name, limited *ipso facto* and therefore not fit to fill the place which was to be filled by an unlimited and absolute power, as the primary cause of all created things. The various meanings of Brahman,

[13] See Newcomb's *Popular Astronomy* p. 456. Also B. G. Tilak. Orion or Researches into the Antiquity of the Vedas.

[14] I shall quote them at length here:—(i) Rv. I, 164, 46. एकं सत् विप्राः बहुधा वदन्ति अग्निं यमं मातरिश्वानं आहुः (ii) Rv. X, 129, 2. आनीत् अवातं स्वधया तत् एकं तस्मात् ह अन्यत् न परः किंचन आस. Also see Max Müller. Physical Religion. pp. 180 *et seq.*

Atman, Tadekam, and the etymology of Brahman from Brih are elaborately discussed. Max Muller dissents from the opinion of Prof. Weber that "the logos-idea had *no* antecedents in Greece to account for it" but was influenced by the Vedic Vách. He says "To say nothing else, *Vâch* is a feminine, *Logos*[15] a masculine, and that involves more than a difference of grammatical gender" (p. 74) and a little further on adds "it is quite true that Prof. Weber was careful to add the clause 'that he did not intend to give any opinion on this question,' but, after such a confession it is hardly becoming to hint that those who have given an opinion on this question, had derived their information from him." Though Prof. Max Muller, in duty bound, deplores the conduct of Prof. Weber, it is all of a piece with what I previously described of him.[16] In connection with this question of Logos, Prof. Max Muller thrashes out the subject of intellectual intercourse between the Hindus and the Greeks in olden days and the limits of possibilities of an exchange of philosophical thought between the two countries, and then reverts to the derivation of Brahman in the following words, "I prefer to begin with Bráhman as a synonym of Brih in Brihaspati, meaning word or speech, and to admit by the side of it another Brahman, meaning that which utters or drives forth (Prachyá vayati) or manifests or creates, that which is the universal support (Skambha) or force (Daksha), in fact Brahman such as we find it afterwards, whether as a neuter, Bráhman or for more popular purposes, as a masculine, Brahmâ" (p. 92). In this he differs from Duesson who proposes for the word a ritualistic origin and from many an another scholar giving or suggesting ever so many possible conjectures. He also believes a remote connection may be scented in point of significance between the Greek Logos and the Indian Brahman considering the relations[17] mind and speech bore to one another in the eyes of the Hindu. And he concludes the chapter, after looking to the meaning and occurrence in the Vedas of the words Atman and the rest, with the lines, "a belief in that Prajapati, as a personal god, was the beginning of monotheistic religion in India, while the recognition of Brahman and Atman as one, constituted the foundation of all the monistic philosophy of that country" (p. 96).

"The systems of philosophy" is the subject of the 3rd chapter. The aim of this chapter is to present the common philosophical ideas shared by all the schools. Such ideas were to be found in the most pronounced form in the classical Upanishads, and having them as the foundations the superstructure of many systems was raised. These germinal notions may be enumerated in the following order, 1. Metempsychosis (Samsara) 2. Immortality 3. The so-called 'pessimism' 4. Karman 5. Infallibility of Veda 6. The three gunas, Satva, Rajas and Tamas. A resumé of the main philosophical systems and their important tenets is given from Madhusudana Sarasvati's Prasthanabhedha, a comparatively modern treatise. After a preliminary account of the various systems, Madhusudana discovers behind the multiple diversity of philosophical growths three main roots of thought comprising, 1. The Arambha Vada,[18] 2. Parinama Vada[19] and 3. Vivarta Vada[20]. Commenting on the description of Nyaya in Prasthana Bheda, Max Muller says, "No one could understand why such things as doubt, example, wrangling &c., could possibly be called categories or *Praedicabalia*, and it is no wonder that Ritter and others should have spoken of the Nyaya with open contempt, as they have done, if such things were represented to them as the categories of Indian Logic" (p. 100). This remark fairly indicates the pitfalls that lie in the path of a Sanskritist who undertakes translations of Sanskrit philosophical works without previous general philosophic culture. We cannot resist remembering in this connection the remarks of Prof. Garbe[21] against Drs. Ballantyne and Hall as translators of the Sankhya aphorisms of Kapila, and those elsewhere of Max Muller pointing to Dr. Rajendra Lal Mitra's version of Patanjali's Yoga Sutras with Bhoja Raja's commentary. He says the six Padarthas[22] of Kanada cannot all be translated by the term categories, because the word Padartha is not rightly translated by category when we apply it to Samavaya. But even if we doubtfully render the sixth and the seventh as categories, the term would of course be quite mischievous when applied to the Padarthas of Gotama. The latter find their place mostly under Prameya.[23] And Madhusudana winds up, after cataloguing in some detail all the systems, as "This, the Vedanta, is indeed the principal of all doctrines, any other doctrine is but a compliment of it, and therefore it alone is to be reverenced by all who wish for liberation, and this according to the interpretation of the

15 For the historical antecedents of the Logos, See Max Müller Theosophy pp 384, *et Seq.*

16 See my article on "Modern Oriental Scholarship," Siddhanta Deepika, Vol II.

17 Vide Sankara's Scholia on The Vedanta Sutras 1,3,28.

18 Under this we might bring Nyaya, Vaiseshika and Mimamsa.

19 nder this we may mention, the Sankhya, Yoga, Pacupata, and Pancharatra Systems, and the Visishtadwaita of Ramanuja.

20 We have under this heading the purely Monistic School of the Adwaitin Sree Sankaracharya and his later followers Vidyaranya, Madhusudana, Vachaspathi Micra, Sureswaracharya and the rest. The still later schools of Vignanabhikshu and others who were of the "Monistic Sankhya" cult may also be brought under this head.

21 Sankhya Sutra Vritti or Aniruddha's commentary and the original parts of Vedantin Mahadeva's commentary to the Sankhya Sutras edited by R. Garbe. Biblioth. Indic. Series. Preface p. VI.

22 They are 1. Dravya 2. Guna 3. Karman 4. Sâmanya (the highest is Satta) 5. Visesha 6. Śamavaya, and to which may be added 7. Abhava.

23 Meaning not so much what has to be proved or established, as what forms the object of our knowledge.

venerable Sankara—this is the secret!" "Here" as Max Muller rightly says "we see clearly that Madhusudana considered the Vedanta philosophy as interpreted by Sankara, if not as the only true one, still as the best of all philosophies." After giving an account of the Prasthana Bheda and its contents, a list of books of reference is suggested for students who might not know Sanskrit. We should think the list is not rich and allows no choice on the part of the student to select from, in addition to some of the books being not very good of their kind. But of course the bibliography he gives in some of the later chapters when dealing with the systems individually and separately is ample. Max Muller after giving, or rather reproducing an account from Madhusudana's book, introduces us to the Brihaspati Sutras, a book that is now lost to us and the existence of which we are now led to infer, both from the account given in the Maitrayaniya Upanishad, of Brihaspati teaching the Asuras pernicious doctrines calculated to do spiritual harm to them and the short estimate given of that philosophy in the chapter on the Charvaka system in the Sarvadarsana Sangraha[24] of Madhava. The Brihaspati Sutras informs us of the cult of the Laukayatikas and the Charvakas, materialists and atheists. About the Vaikhanasa Sutras we find an allusion made by Bhaskaracharya[25] and they were possibly intended for Vanaprasthas. Max Muller is almost silent about them. The Bhikshu Sutras, quoted by Panini[26] is referred to, intended it would seem according to Max Muller for Brahmanic mendicants, though identified by Taranatha Tarkavachaspati[27] with the Vedanta Sutras. These Sutras are now entirely lost for us. The dates of the whole literature of the Sutras are in great uncertainty. We cannot be sure always when the Sutras attained their literary written-down form after undergoing through generations of years countless changes at the hands of every devoted student and receiving accretions in all ways. The latest of them namely the Sankhya Sutras can be set down at the 14th century A. D. Not that the Sankhya philosophy is modern is the inference we are warranted in making from such a recent date, but that a body of Sankhyan doctrines were in the air from a very ancient time, perhaps as ancient as the Brahmana period, because their existence is testified to by Icvarakrishna's[28] Karikas, and the Tattva Samasa, though some contend that the latter is a modern work, and others[29] urge that in it are contained the original Sankhya aphorisms themselves though receiving some additions from a later generation or the commentator, and that the doctrines so existing in the mouths of the Sankhyan votaries received their final literary form in the 14th century A. D. The most ancient Sutras existed as accepted doctrines long before the time of Buddha and began to take their literary form and be fixed as such in the memory of men belonging to particular schools, from the sixth century B. C. up till the second century B.C. We cannot be sure of setting more definite limits in the matter of dates and so can merely say that the dogma and cult of each school must have been reduced from their amorphous state to the formulated condition in which we find it in the Sutras presented to us at the time indicated above. It goes without saying that even after the literary shackles of the Sutra-form were put upon them, they were never invaded by that petrifaction, which cripples thoughts and allows no more reformation, addition or amplification, till comparatively very recent times. All the time after the 2nd century B. C., they have been receiving ever so many changes as each Asrama of disciples handled them, thought about them and began to work upon them. This would explain why sometimes, as in the Yoga-Sutras of Patanjali, apparently incongruous statements appear from the hand of the same fictitious author, and why the tenets expounded in one chapter do not tally with what are taught in the next. The name of the author is tackled on to the Sutras as a sort of respect shown to the original thinker or compiler, and they go on growing from generation to generation. We know in the Brahma Sutras, there are places in which it is said explicitly that Bádarayana says so and so. No author would speak of himself in the third person and the explanation we have given would throw light upon such apparent anomalies which ever appear in the Sutra literature of India. So to speak, if we may compare the period of metaphysical activity which characterised India in the sixth century B. C. and in which for the first time the various codes of systems got to the first stage of literary crystallization, to a fermenting vat, Buddha we may term as one of the very proliferous yeast-cells. The gymnosophist Nirgrantha or Gnathiputra was one of the older cells in this vat and many an other cell was active when the vat was fermenting, and with the subsidy of fermentation some of them died, a few among which leaving a trace of their life-history, while a large number have survived with their progeny thriving and very healthy. About the common philosophical fund underlying all philosophies, we may with pleasure note that Prof. Max Muller appears quite just in his observations and completely defensive in guarding the Indian cause. Because when speaking about the so-called element of "Pessimism" with which foreigners have charged the Indian Philosophy, he is right in retorting that the Indian Philosophers are by no means dwelling for ever on the

24 Cowell and Gough. Sarvadarsana Sangraha pp. 2-12. Charvaka System.

25 Scholia on Brahma Sutras III, 3, 5, 3.

26 Panini. Ashtadhyayi IV. 3. 110.

27 Siddhanta Kaumudi edited with a commentary named Sarala by T. Tarkavachaspathi Vol I, p. 592.

28 Popularly, Sankhya Kârikas with a commentary by Gaudapada and also with another gloss by Vachaspathi Micra.

29 This is Max Muller's view.

miseries of life, and they are not always whining and protesting that life is not worth living. They simply state that they received the first impulse to philosophical reflection on viewing the suffering in the world. And in Max Muller's words "considering that the aim of all Indian Philosophy was the removal of suffering, which was caused by nescience, and the attainment of the highest happiness, which was produced by knowledge, we should have more right to call it *Eudaemonistic* than *Pessimistic*" (p. 140). When the cause of the apparent suffering which necessitates the Indian Philosopher to look to the true springs of happiness, considering that sorrow, weariness, disappointment and pain appertain to the flesh, is inquired into, all the philosophic cults have but one answer to give, though in different ways or forms. The Vedanta gives Avidya,[30] the Sankhya, Aviveka,[31] the Nyaya, Mithyagnana[32] and so on, and to break this *Bandha* of ignorance by genuine Gnana is the consoling work of Philosophy. About the Gunas as a common factor in all philosophies in India, we have only to say they are made up of three constituents which correspond[33] in a near way with Hegel's Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis. In the most general sense they represent no more than a series comprising three terms, the two extremes standing for Rajas and Tamas, and the middle term for Sattva. Tension between these qualities, according to Indian Philosophy, produces activity and stuggle. Equilibrium leads to temporary or final rest. This principle is applied over and over again in systems that recognise a Cosmic Parinama or Evolution, such as the Sankhya, where every step in the building of the Cosmos is explained by an application of the principle of the preponderance or equality of the Gunas. Prof. Max Muller's vindication of the ultimate *Duhkha-Nivarana* of every one of the Indian Philosophies, be it the Purva Mimamsa's service in lessening the ordinary afflictions of man by means of sacrifices, the Uttara-Mimamsa's removal of Nescience through Vidya, the Sankhya's promise of a complete cessation of all pain by the liberation of the Purusha, the Yoga's reaching Kaivalya by Samadhi, the Vaiseshika's final cessation of all pain by the promise of a knowledge of Truth and Gotama's holding out Apavarga from the complete destruction of all pain by means of logic, against the charge of Pessimism brought against it by undiscerning critics who have no brains to feel that philosophy is not after all suicide, is very just and sympathetic, and it shows in the author a true insight into the very core and tenor of the Indian philosophy. What strikes us always as *par excellence* about the Professor is the almost Hindu devotional spirit that lights up his weighty words and the genuine feeling of a real Vedantin or rather an Indian philosopher, that inspires his words and gives a reverent charm to his earnest expositions.

We how pass to the 4th Chapter which treats of the Vedanta or Uttara Mimamsa. All through the chapter he takes as the type of the Vedanta School, Sankara, since he is an Ultra-Monist and represents the ancient tradition and spirit of the Upanishads, though there may be two opinions if he is portraying Badarayana rightly, and is a consistent logician carrying with unflinching precision the results to their final and legitimate conclusion when once the premisses are granted. The account which Max Müller gives of the Vedanta is very clear and takes up all its recondite and obscure points one by one and clears them up in a way that will appeal to European readers. The moot point of the origin ot Nescience is well touched upon. Speaking about Badarayana, Max-Muller says, "He is to us a name, and an intellectual power, but nothing else. We know the date of his great Commentator, Samkara[34] in the 8th Cent. A. D. or 7th Century A. D. and we know that another commentator was even earlier. We also know that Bodhayana's commentary was followed by Ramanuja. It is quite possible that Bodhayana,[35] like Ramanuja, represented a more ancient and faithful interpretation of Badarayana's Sutras, and that Sankara's philosophy in its unflinching Monism is his own rather than Badarayana's. But no manuscript of Bodhayana has yet been discovered." We do not know what Max Muller means by the possibility of Ramanuja's representing a more ancient and faithful interpretation of Badarayana, on the reason of his having Bodhayana, another interpreter, before him. If on this argument there is a possibility for Ramanuja to reflect an ancient interpretation of Badarayana, the possibility is twice in the case of Sankara, because he has going before him Gaudapada,[36]

30 *Nescience.*

31 *Nondiscrimination.*

32 *False Knowledge.*

33 In this manner:—Hegel's *Thesis* to the Indian *Sattva*, his *Antithesis* to the Indian *Tamas*, and *Synthesis* to *Rajas*.

34 Vide, however, System des Vedanta of Duessen, p. 37; Also Fleet. Indian Antiquary, Jan. 1887, P. 41; Again Mr. Pâthaka in the Indian Ant. XI, 174. Mr. Telang fixes Sankara's date as early as 590 A. D.

35 Thibaut. Vedanta-Sutras with Sankara's Comment. S. B. E. p. XXII. We must note however here that Dramidabhashya, a commentary on Bodhayana is supported by Sankara sometimes. Vide. Sankara on Chhandogya Upanishad—V. V. R.

36 The stemma of Sankara is found in the verse.

ओं नारायणं पद्मभवं वसिष्ठं शक्तिंच तत्पुत्रपराशरंच
व्यासं शुकं गौडपदं महान्तं गोविन्दयोगीन्द्रमथास्यशिष्यं ।
श्री शङ्कराचार्य मथाऽस्यपद्मपादं चहस्तामलकं चशिष्यं
तं त्रोटकं वार्तिककारमन्यान् अस्मद्गुरून् सन्ततमानतोऽस्मि॥

Here evidently वार्तिककार refers to Sureswaracharya, the author of the colossal commentary on the Scholia of Sankara to the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad.

Upavarsha and others. Gaudapada is the author of a Bhashya[37] on the Sankhya-Karika of Icvarakrishna, and the grand-Guru of Sankara. Possibly he is older than Bodhayana who is little else but a figment of fancy to us in the absence of any works ascribed to him or contemporary evidence. And Upavarsha is the one mentioned in Kathasaritsagara[38] as the teacher of Panini though about the identity Max Muller entertains some doubt. As such when once the identity is granted the commentator Upavarsha must be shifted to the Sutra period itself, which means considerably prior in time to Bodhayana. We see therefore that Sankara was *a prominent teacher* of the Monistic School which had its *paramparas* as much before as afterwards. In fact we find in Gaudapada's Karikas[39] on the Mandukya Upanishad distinct ideas about Maya, about विवर्तवाद and about Advaitism in Sankara's sense. So that Sankara does not deserve any credit as the exclusive author of the Monistic Theory. He was essentially an excellent expounder, but buckled also with the strong armour of aggressive controversy, and therefore, represented a recension only of the Monistic School that had its beginnings in the dateless past. About Upavarsha we know that he was Panini's preceptor and one of Sankara's *Acharaya Varga*. In this way we see that on the score of antiquity Sankara has more historical persons to support his cult.[40] And if for one or two Sutras of Badarayana, Ramanuja's explanation would fit in better, three times the number of it could be shown in the same book where Sankara's would do so best. Our concluding evidence of fidelity to the original meaning and the rest, must rest only on our knowing the real view of Badarayana, which must be a sphinx defying solution till we get at another book of Badarayana's giving us a clearer insight into his views. As it is, it is indiscreet to venture on guesses. Thibaut, on whose introduction to his Translation of the Brahma Sutras so much devolves, had, as his Pundit-friends to assist him at translating Sankara's scholia, two Visishtadwaitins,[41] both Professors in the Benares Sanskrit College. The case, one can imagine, will be entirely different, if a scholar like Duessen, Max Müller or the late M. N. Dvivedi, who will combine with previous philosophic training splendid independent capacities for translation, would go to the work as a monist. As a matter of fact, Duessen's interpretation of the Sutras is at entire variance with Thibaut's. After all, whether ancient or modern, as in science so in philosophy, there ought to be progress in thought and the evidence of it is to be sought in the works of men standing the test of every logical proof, every right inquiry, every zealous argument. If Ramanuja who lived as late as the 13 cent A. D. could quote the name of a phantom-commentator Bodhayana, to testify to whose existence there is not a vestige of historical evidence left, and if thereby he could claim priority of teaching and faithfulness of interpretation of the Vedanta Sutras, how much more should Sankara, a thinker who lived as old as the 8th century A.D., who could claim among his Guru-Parampara, a grand-preceptor in Gaudapada and a hoary commentator in Bhagavad Upavarsha, do so for his views? Sankara's philosophy cannot be said therefore to be his own in as much as Ramanuja's cannot be. Both represented independent streams of tradition and the streams must have taken their rise in ancient days. Both must have had their own Paramparas. Both were Huxleys suddenly necessitated for the support of Darwins growing effete. Sankara's philosophy, even if said to be at variance with Badarayana's, can claim a still greater antiquity, nay the greatest antiquity, because it reflects the Upanishads in the most correct and consistent manner.[42] About the strength of his views and the unapproachable power of his arguments I need not speak here, because Max Müller himself speaks about them very elaborately in the book under review and elsewhere with overflowing admiration.

Prof. Max Müller in discussing the identity or otherwise of the Vyasa of the Mahabharat and the Vyasa of the Brahma Sutras, wants to make a case out of the different styles of the two works, and so he says " Vyasa or Krishna Dvaipayana is the name given to the author of the Mahabharata, and no two styles can well be more different than that of

37 An edition of the book is extant, translated and annotated by Wilson and Colebrooke.

38 Vide Tawney's Translation of Somadeva's Kathasarithsagara Biblioth. Ind. Series.

39 Mandukya Upanishad with Gaudapada-Karika and Sankara-Bhashya. Anandashrama Series. The following are some of the Slokas from the Karikas of Gaudapada in which we find the most emphatic utterances of Monism and the theory of Maya :—

न निरोधो नचोत्पत्ति र्नबद्धो नच साधकः ।
न मुमुक्षु र्नवैमुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥ P. 86.

सतोहि मायया जन्म युज्यते नतुतत्त्वतः ।
तत्त्वतो जायतेयस्य जातं तस्यहि जायते ॥ P. 132.

नकश्चिज्जायते जीवः संभवोऽस्य नविद्यते ।
एतत्तदुत्तमं सत्यं यत्रकिंचिन्नजायते ॥ P. 148 and repeated once again at the end of the topic on p. 193.

40 What has often been quoted as the shortest summary of the Vedanta in a couple of lines represents the Vedanta of Sankara, not of Ramanuja :—

श्लोकार्धेन प्रवक्ष्यामि यदुक्तं ग्रन्थकोटिभिः ।
ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरं ॥ See, moreover, Max Muller. Theosophy, pp. 317 et seq.

41 Their names are, I believe, Rama Misra Sastrin and Yagneswara Sastrin. Thibaut. Vedanta Sutras with Sankara Bhashya. Introduction.

42 Max Muller. Theosophy, p. 113. " If we take the Upanishads, as a whole, I should say that Sankara is the more thorough and faithful exponent of their Teaching."

the Vyâsa of the Mahabharata, and that of Vyâsa, the supposed author of the so-called Vyâsa-Sutras" (p. 153.) If other things pointed to the identity between the two, this cannot be taken as any argument to disprove it, since we know there are various things to determine the diction of an author, such as the nature of the subject, the form in which he chooses to write, the literary style he has perfected at a particular stage in his life. We have seen how S. P. Pandit[43] in his edition of Malavikagnimitra has exploded Prof. Wilson's wrong views and shown that the Kalidasa of Malavikagnimitra and that of Raguvamsa and Sakuntala though apparently various, yet, judging from the sameness of imagery between the two, and noting that the surface-differences of style in their books are explained by stages in the growth of the perfection of literary manner, were really one. And we have another living example in the variant styles of Taranatha Tarka Vachaspathi. Any good Sanskrit student must perceive the difference of style in his Asubodha-Vyakaranam, a work written in Sutra-form which cannot boast of literary grace by any means, from his ordinary mode in the Encyclopaedic Lexicon, Vachaspatya, marked by ease, flow, elegance and nervousness. The same may be said of the disparity of diction patent between Vidyaranya's Panchadasi and his Jivanmuktiviveka. The difference of style is no complete test, whatever may be said of evidences otherwise adduced. Prof. Max Muller's linguistic explanation as to why the name Vyasa should become connected with the Mahabharata and with the Brahma Sutras by pointing to its meaning as a noun *viz*, 'compilation' or 'arrangement,' is we believe given in playful humour. It is a curious thing in the Indian world of letters, we would urge to the attention of Max Muller, that the name of every great person connected with any classical movement or work, is often such as can bear a meaning enlightening us about the labours of the owner of the appellation, so that the meaning of an author's name suiting his work, should not lead us to vague surmises about his non-existence, and about the presence of a *modus operandi* alone regarding the writing of a book, or the way in which it was handed down. Any way we must rest content with the reflection that these were the names suggested by adherents, or cotemporary men, to the author in consonance with his acts, in place of his true name. This amphyboly of names is not a rare thing in Sanskrit Literature. Other things being equal therefore we may leave the disparity of style etc. between the Mahabharata and the Vyasa Sutras quite out of account, as it makes a hair of difference either in supporting or weakening a view. On P. 154, occurs the statement "Vachaspati Micra declares that the Bhikshu Sutras are the same as the Vedanta Sutras and that the followers of Parasarya were in consequence called Parasarins." Evidently Max Muller is making a mistake here, it is Taranatha Tarka Vachaspathi"[44], and not Vachaspathi Micra that declares the identity of Bhikshu and the Vedanta Sutras. The occurrence of Vachaspathi in both the names has been the cause of the mistake in Max Müller's book, because he himself rightly gives the reference on P. 113, note 2. When discussing the relative age of the Vedanta Sutras and the Bhagavat Gita, Max Muller quotes a passage from the latter in which occurs the expression *Brahma Sutras* and to which a wrong reference is given. It is the 4th sloka[45] of Chapter XIII and not the 3rd one as pointed out by Max Müller. Max Muller takes this *Brahma Sutras* to refer to the Vyasa Sutras and he has forgotten that Sankara who was the most ancient commentator[46] whose works have reached us of both Bhagavat Gita and Brahma Sutras and who therefore was in a better position to judge of reference and like, explains ब्रह्मसूत्रपदैः by ब्रह्मणःसूचकानि वाक्यानि ब्रह्मसूत्राणि तैः पद्यते गम्यते ज्ञायते ब्रह्मेति तानिपदान्युच्यन्ते, though Anandagiri who is a later scholiast on Sankara suggests as an alternative explanation, also a reference to व्याससूत्राणि[47]. He suggests as the greatest concession made to the antiquity of the Gita that it may be contemporaneous with the Brahma-Sutras. We should think with Sankara that the expression 'Brahma Sutras' does not refer to the Vedanta Sutras but to a different subject altogether. Professor Max Muller does not give us any cogent proof to substantiate his statement, rather the very theory he propounds goes against him[48]. The hazy conjec-

43 Vide Malavikagnimitra of Kalidasa by S. P. Pandit, Bombay Sanskrit Series, Introduction.

44 Of course Taranatha bases his note on the works of Bhattoji Dikshita, Nagoji Bhatta and Gnanendra Sarasvati. Vide his edition of Siddhanta Kaumudi, Vol 1. p. 592

45 The Passage is this :—

ऋषिभि र्बहुनागीतं छन्दोभि र्विविधैः पृथक् ।
ब्रह्मसूत्रपदैश्चैव हेतुमद्भिर्विनिश्चितैः ॥

46 It has latterly been urged sometimes by Dravidian students that Sreekantha was anterior to Sankara, but we must keep this view, at the most, in abeyance till better contemporary evidence is brought to light. I will take up this question in a future number. See however Siddhanta Deepika, vol. 2, p. 250, *et seq.*

47 Anandagiri says, "अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा" इत्यादीन्यपि सूत्राणि अत्रगृहीतानि after suggesting first आदिपदेन "ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परं" "अथयोन्यां देवतां" इत्यादीनि विद्यासूत्राणि उक्तानि. Bhagavad-Gita. Anandasrama edition. p. 375.

48 For Max Muller advances that under the same name, different bodies of religious tenets may appear in successive generations when mnemonic literature was the only resource. So even granting as Max Müller urges, that the Gita referred to the Brahma Sutras, it may be to a code of doctrines which were essentially different from the later Vyasa Sutras, since a body of doctrines undergoes ever so many changes before they reach their final literary form. As such the Professor's suggestion does not hold water in either way. Assuming a reference to "Brahma Sutras" which is quite unlikely, it ought to have been to a body of doctrines of that name analogous to or different from the later Vyasa Sutras, but which might possibly have been the original germs that developed into the mature Vyasa Sutras.

மகாமகோபாத்யாய
டாக்டர். உ. வே. சாமிநாதையர்
நூல் நிலையம்,
சென்னை-600090.

tures he makes even defying the view of native commentators are not supported by the evidence of any literary document. We have not the requisite space to travel over the question even fairly adequately to support Sankara's interpretation.[49] For one aspect of the same question which leads us to Sankara's view, we will refer the reader to Telang's able treatment of it in his edition of the Bhagavad Gita[50] in the Sacred Books of the East. After a careful examination of the internal and external evidences, he comes to the conclusion that the Gita belongs to a period very anterior to that of the Sutras, that in the one we have the chaotic and plastid germs of an amorphous conglomerate of the various philosophical schools, while in the other we find systems distinctly marked out and ready made, and that in fact one belongs to the Upanishad and Brahmana period and the other to the later Sutra period, when not only definite philosophical systems, but also law books were formed. Max Muller is, beyond doubt, echoing Sankara and truly representing the Vedanta when he says, "But we must remember that it is the highest object of the *Vedanta* to prove that there is only one true reality namely Brahman, and that the manifoldness of the visible world is but the result of that Nescience which the *Vedanta* is meant to destroy" (p. 192). He repeats the same Advaitic, or Brahmavadin's view when he says "It is the very object of the Vedanta philosophy to expel, and annihilate this Avidya and replace it by Vidya."[51] On p. 203, the Professor informs us, "As long as creation is conceived as a making or fashioning of matter, it *does not exist* for Badarayana. Creation with Badarayana would be nothing but the result of Nescience." 'Is this Ramanuja's view?', we would ask, who believes that God is the real *Karta* of a Noumenal Cosmic Evolution, and if it were not, it is a serious puzzle if he is representing Badarayana correctly. What to Sankara, and of course to Badarayana, is Vyavaharartham, is Satyam to Ramanuja. Later on, in p. 220, Max Muller states, "It sometimes seems as if Sankara and Badarayana had actually admitted not only two kinds of knowledge, but two Brahmans also, Sagunam and Nirgunam, with or without qualities, but this would again apply to a state of Nescience or Avidya only;". Surely this militates against the supposition that Ramanuja is a faithful interpreter of Badarayana. Speaking about the highest point reached by Indian philosophers, Max Muller exclaims "None of our philosophers, not excepting Heraclitus, Plato, Kant or Hegel, has ventured to erect such a spire never frightened by storms or lightnings. Stone follows on stone in regular succession after once the first step has been made, after once it has been clearly seen that in the beginning there can have been but One, as there will be but One in the end, whether we call it Atman or Brahman * * * * We cannot but admire the boldness with which the Hindu Metaphysician[52] impressed with the miseries and evanescence of the world, could bring himself to declare even the Logos to be but the result of Avidya or Nescience, so that in the destruction of that Avidya could be recognised the highest object, and the *summum bonum* (Purushartha) of man. We need not praise or try to imitate a Colosseum, but if we have any heart for the builders of former days, we cannot help feeling that it was a colossal and stupendous effort. And this is the feeling that I cannot resist in examining the ancient Vedánta.[53] Other philosophers have denied the reality of the world as perceived, but no one has ventured to deny at the same time the reality of what we call the Ego, the senses and the mind and their inherent forms" (p 240). As regards the mistake that has prevailed in construing Sankara wrongly, the Professor feelingly adds "The danger with Sankara's Vedantism was that what to him was simply phenomenal, should be taken for purely fictitious. There is however as great a difference between the two as there is between Avidya and Mithyagnana. Maya is the cause of a phenomenal, not of a fictitious world; and if Sankara adopts the Vivarta instead of the Parinama doctrine, there is always something on which the Vivarta or Illusion is at work,[54] and which can not be deprived of its reality" (p. 243). After giving an account of the historical character of Ramanuja's doctrines and the claim his exposition has on our attention, and demonstrating also to us that Ramanuja was one of the legitimate orthodox interpreters of the Brahma Sutras, Max Müller continues, "We ought therefore to look on Ramanuja as a perfect equal of Sankara, so far as his right of interpreting Badarayana's Sutras, according to his own opinion, is concerned * * *. The individual philosopher is but the mouth-piece of tradition, and that tradition goes back further and further, the more we try to fix it chronologically" (p. 245); again "In the absence of any definite historical materials it is quite impossible for us to say whether, in the historical development of the philosophy at the time of Badarayana and afterwards, it was the absolute Monism as represented by Sankara that took the lead, or whether the more temperate Monism as we see it in Ramanuja's commentary that exercised an earlier sway." (pp. 248 *et seq*). Alluding afterwards to the archaic nature of the doctrines held forth in Ramanuja's system, our book states, "But it does not follow that

49 *cf.* Weber's Indian Lit. p. 242. Also Lassen's Preface to his edition of Schlegel's Gita, p. XXXV.

50 *ibid* Introduction pp. 31 *et seq.* and *ante.*

51 *op. cit.* p. 199; *cf.* also Max Muller. Three Lectures on the Vedanta, P. 62.

52 Evidently MaxMuller has in mind Sankara.

53 For the same strain of admiring veneration vide also Max Muller. Psychological Religion pp. 281, 311, 313, 314, 319.

54 I would advise the reader in support of Max Muller's true interpretation, to look up Sankara's gloss on the Vedanta Sutras III, 2, 3., where the Sutras distinctly speak of Maya.

this whether *heretical or ordhodox*[55] opinion was really first propounded by Ramanuja * * *". The only possible view that can be maintained by an impartial critic who looks to the true cult of Badarayana, is advanced when the Professor remarks on page 250, "Dr. Thibaut therefore seems to me to be quite right when he says that both Sankara and Ramanuja pay often *less regard to the literal sense of the words and to tradition* than to their desire of forcing Badarayana to bear testimony to the truth of their own philosophical theories." Max Muller is mistaken in believing that in India Ramanuja weilds a very large amount of influence over the people, but as a matter of fact Sankara's followers would exceed in point of number[56] all men of other following put together. As regards his own individual opinion and convictions about the Vedanta, Max Muller says in great cheer, "At the same time I make no secret that all my life I have been very fond of the Vedanta, nay, I can fully agree with Schopenhauer and quite understand what he meant when he said, '*** it (the study of the Upanishads) has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death'. Schopenhauer was the last man to write at random and to allow himself to go into ecstasies over so-called mystic and inarticulate thought. And *I am neither afraid nor ashamed to say that I share his enthusiasm for the Vedanta, and feel indebted to it for much that has been helpful to me in my passage through life*[57]". We do not know if we want, as the latest testimony to the consoling influence of Advaitism, any more explicit confession from such an aged scholar, given for scores of years to studying our philosophy. For more explicit statements, setting Sankara as the keenest and most consistent logician and the most pregnant philosopher the world has ever seen, we would refer the reader to Max Muller's Theosophy[58]. In the opinion of Max Muller, Ramanuja is not a consistent philosopher[59] or unflinching logician, since he is obliged to act the part of an egg-dancer, by trying to weave the popular conceptions of divinities, gods and goddesses into Advaitism, and thereby making his system, hardly a well-knit logical or philosophical whole.

With an account of the main points of Ramanaja's teaching we are taken to Chap. V, which deals with the Pûrva Mimâmsa philosophy, if philosophy it may be called. In instituting a sort of comparison between the life-history of the Vedanta-Sutras and the Pürva Mîmâmsa, Max Müller observes, on P. 259, "It is clear that while Badarayana endeavoured to introduce order into the Upanishads, and to reduce their various guesses to something like a system, Jaimini undertook to do the same for the rest of the Veda, the so-called Karma-Kanda or work-portion, that is, all that had regard to sacrifice as described chiefly in the Brahmanas"; and again on P. 260, "And as philosophy existed independent of the Upanishads, and through Badarayana attempted to make peace with the Upanishads, we must consider that sacrifices also existed for a long time without the Brahmanas, such as we possess them, that they grew up without being restrained by generally binding authorities of any kind, and that at a later time only, after the Brahmanas had been composed, and had acquired some kind of authority, the necessity began to be felt of reconciling variant opinions and customs, as embodied in the Brahmanas and elsewhere, giving general as well as special rules for the performance of every kind of ceremony." The latter observation really savours of the rule and compass work of a carpenter. It is exceedingly unjust for one to approach these ancient treatises with pre-conceived theories, and to try to make the origin, progress and the like of ceremonies and sacrifices treated of in the Brahmanas, and the method of their performance and its justification in the Purva-Mimamsa, fit in with the fancies of the orientalist. The inference we are warranted in making, from the observation of Max Müller's, is that there was a time when the Brahmanas existed without any bearing on sacrifices, without any influence over ritualistic acts. This in the nature of things cannot have been when once we seriously inquire what the Brahmanas were meant for. But, no boubt, it is likely that in the domain of metaphysical speculations a different phenomenon might occur. Schools of thought independent of those the Upanishads take cognizance of, might have existed in the brains of some impulsive souls. We can conceive, as a possibility, and even as a probability, that colonies of thought remained, without receiving the sanction of any sacred canon, outside the pale of Asramas, where expositions of the Upanishads went on for countless generations at the hands of the Rishis; but metaphysical

55 The italics are my own.

56 Vide Duessen. Elements of Metaphysics, p. 324, "Of a hundred Vedantins (I have it from a well-informed person who is himself a zealous adversary of Sankara, and follower of Ramanuja [evidently Duessen means Mr. Rama Misra Sastry of the Benares Sanskrit College—V. V R.]) fifteen perhaps adhere to Ramanuja, five to Madhva, five to Vallabha, and seventy-five to Sankaracharya."

57 The italics are my own; cf Max Muller. Vedanta Philosophy, concluding part of the third lecture.

58 "Whatever we may think of this philosophy, we cannot deny its metaphysical boldness and its logical consistency. If Brahman is all in all, the One without a second, nothing can be said to exist that is not Brahman. There is no room for anything outside the Infinite and the Universal, nor is there room for two Infinites, for the Infinite in nature and the Infinite in man. There is and there can be one Infinite and one Brahman only; this is the beginning and end of the Vedanta, and I doubt whether Natural Religion can reach or has ever reached a higher point than that reached by Sankara, as an interpreter of the Upanishads."— MaxMuller. Theosophy, p. 311 *infra* "From a purely logical point of view, Sankara's position seems to me impregnable, and when so rigorous a logician as Schopenhauer declares his complete submission to Sankara's arguments, there is no fear of their being upset by other logicians."—*ibid* p. 281. *supra*; cf. also pp. 319, 315 and 314. (Also *inter alia* his Three Lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy.)

59 *ibid*. pp. 313, 319 and 191.

speculations which could go on untramelled without shocking the theological susceptibilities of the Indians, as testified to by the history of philosophic thought in India, are something entirely different from ritualistic observances, sacrificial liturgies and periodic religious rites which had a particular spiritual end in view necessitating their performance, and to a scrupulous adherence to which, with unswerving attention, even to the minutest details, the Brahmins of all days have been remarkable. We must make a distinction between philosopical speculations which can go on unimpeded, and deeds of a religious nature which anticipated rewards and so on in the other world. Over such religious rites with the most momentous consequences, the Brahmanas weilded authority in appointing times for their celebration, in instructing the clergy for the proper conduct of the sacrificial services, in ordaining that particular series of hymns from the Samhitas should be chanted, chorally or antiphonally, in the sacrificial pavilion. In the matter of the sacrificial performances, through which the Hindu believed to conquer the sting of Death, and which was so dear to his pious nature, it is most unphilosophical to believe, that he would have gone on without any compelling sacred authority to regulate them, without an inviolable scriptural dictate ordaining injunctions to carry out with the utmost religiosity every minute detail of the sacrificial services, in the spiritual efficacy of which he so much believed. In fact, he did want a sacrificial almanac, so to say, to which he might appeal without difficulty as an authority, how and when the sacrifices were to be performed. Such a sacrificial code exactly was, what the Brahmanas meant to supply. It is ill-conceivable, therefore, how the Brahmanas can at any time have existed as theoretical books, void of any authority and having no sway over the doings of sacrificers. We may on the whole conclude that, as far as India is concerned, it passes one's reason, and even fancy, to reflect that sacrifices were in vogue at any time without the superintending and controlling authority of the Brahmanas, or that the Brahmanas existed at all without having an unassailable voice in most sacrificial doings, that Jaimini attempted to effect a reconciliation between the sanctionless rites of happy-go-lucky Brahmins and the uncurbed theoretical rules finding an eccentric utterance in the Brahmanas; though we may sometimes grant with not a little reservation, that Badarayana's efforts were towards effecting a reconciliation between some of the uncanonical doctrines propounded by men who were outside the influence of the Upanishads, and the Upanishads themselves. Here again it is questionable if the Upanishads ever remained without exercising the most imperative supremacy in the particular Asramas in which they were severally taught. What is most probable is, that the Brahmanas varied with the Asramas in which they were the ruling authority, and the Purva Mimamsa sought to find in them a common thought inspiring all acts, and to harmonise, codify, and justify any differences that existed between observances of two different parts. If the Brahmanas had been composed independently of the sacrifies which the Brahmins were performing, who composed them and what were their intention in doing so? And where were the real rules, which were used as liturgies for the Brahmin's sacrificial services, if the Brahmanas exercised no controlling authority of any kind in regulating them? We can hardly imagine there was a time when the Brahmanas and the sacrifices did not exist side by side, for independent of any bearing on sacrifices, one cannot surmise what they existed for, and what good purpose can have been served by compiling treatises of rules for sacrifices which had no binding authority on the sacrifices of any people, nay, of any Asrama. If we assume Max Muller's theory, it is hardly possible for us to puzzle out, what earthly interest the authors of the Brahmanas can have had, in compiling them at a time when no sacrifices existed to take heed of them, when, in fact, nobody cared to hear what they had to say, and what non-human kind of gentlemen those compilers ought to have been, to theorise and dogmatise about things which had little to do either with mundane or celestial matters.

On page 274 a curious mistake occurs in the sentence "For instance, we read that trees or serpents performed a sacrifice, or that an old fox sang foolish songs fit for the *Madras*." What is meant here is not *Madras* but *Mâdras*. Adverting to the short-sightedness of those who charge others, that do not agree with their own views of God, worship and final absolution, with irreligion, Max Muller says "Modern Vedantists also are so enamoured of their own conception of Deity, that is of Brahman or Atman, that they do not hesitate, like Vivekânanda, for instance, in his recent address on Practical Vedanta, 1896, to charge those who differ from himself with atheism." If this virtue of tolerance, to which Max Muller is asking the attention of those who differ from him, is understood and followed, there will not be at the persent day half as much quarrel and useless controversy about relgious tenets, that stock the pages of many a useless pamphlet now circulating in South India. A reference to Siddhanta Deepika, 1898 p. 194, is given on p. 267 *infra* of his book when the Professor, after giving, according to the principles of logic followed sometimes by commentators on early Mimamsa, the five members of an Adhikarana,[60] viz, Vishaya,[61] Samsaya,[62] Purvapaksha,[63] Siddhanta,[64] and Samgati,[65] takes a practical example from the commentary on the first and second sutras

60=case, 61=subject to be explained, 62=doubt, 63=the first side or *prima facie* view, 64=the demonstrated conclusion, 65=the connection.

of the Mimamsa, to illustrate their application and use and the reference is evidently to the translation of Srikanta Bhashya on the Vedanta sutras by Mr. A. Mahadeva Sastry, in which we get fertile examples of full adhikaranas. On the page to which Maxmuller refers, we get as Adhikarana 2 of IInd Adhayaya, the case of Sutra II, i, 3., "Thereby has yoga been answered." No doubt we get a very good idea of what a syllogism is like in Indian logic, from this Adhikarana, though there are other Adhikaranas to which we might profitably refer our readers for a better illustrating example of the Indian syllogism of five terms. Speaking about the question 'Has the Veda a superhuman origin?', Professor Max Müller exhibits to us some of the leading principles by which the votaries of the Mimamsa were guided in arguing out the subject. He says that the Hindus show a decided advance in religious thought, nay, in philosophical musings, because they have begun to doubt even in those early days the infallibility and superhuman origin of the Veda and sought to establish it by a serious course of subtle arguments. The Mimamsa philosopher, according to him, would have argued that as no writer could relate his own death, therefore, Dueteronomy must be considered the work of a superhuman writer. "Inspiration in the ordinary sense of the word would not have satisfied these Indian orthodox philosophers, for, as they truly remark, this would not exclude the possiblility of error, because however true the message might be when given, the human recipient would always be a possible source of error as being liable to misapprehend and misinterpret such a message" (p.271). So that for everything, the Mimmasakas wanted to make sure of the limits of human knowledge; and the infallibility and superhuman origin of the Veda was established on pure principles of reasoning and inference, in their own way, of course. Against the charge that, in no sense, the Purva-Mimamsa, in fact any phase of Indian thought, can be brought under a system of philosophy according to European canons, Prof. Max Müller's defence is well worth reading. He says, having in mind his European brethren, "Our idea of a system of philosophy is different from the Indian conception of a Darsana. In its original meaning philosophy as a love of wisdom, comes nearest to the Sanskrit Jigñása, a desire to know, if not a desire to be wise. If we take philosophy in the sense of an examination of our means of knowledge (Epistemology), or with Kant as an enquiry into the limits of human knowledge, there would be nothing corresponding to it in India * * * *. But we have only to waive the claim of infallibility put forward by Badarayana in favour of the utterances of the sages of the Upanishads, and treat them as simple human witnesses to the truth, and we should then find in the systematic arrangement of these utterances by Badarayana a real philosophy, a complete view of the Kosmos in which we live, like those that have been put forward by the great thinkers of the philosophical countries of the world, Greece, Italy, Germany, France and England." Now coming to Jaimini's ethics, the reward which the sacrificer received for performing sacrifices, did not accrue from any superintending Lord of the Cosmos or Brahman, but issued as a result, or an invisible something, something Apûrva or Miraculous, of the deed which represented the reward inherent in good works; or in other words, according to Jaimini, for the moral government of the world, no Lord is necessary. Here we see then that Jaimini differs from Badarayana. This was not atheism, as some accuse the Puryamimamsa cult as tending to, but was an attempt to clear the Lord from those charges of cruelty or undue partiality which have so often been brought against Him by the unthinking multitude. And in the Professor's words, it "was another attempt at justifying the wisdom of God, an ancient Theodicée, that whatever we may think of it, certainly did not deserve the name of atheism." The Mimasakas merely tried to justify the ways of God in their own way. The account that is given of the Mimamsa philosophy in the book, is culled from Madhava's Nyâya-Mâlâ-Vistara, [66] a sort of modern digest embodying in good form and lucid arrangement, what is said by Jaimiri in his Mimamsa Sutras, and also the later developments in the hands of commentators, Kumarilla Bhatta [67] and Prabhâkara. Though the ritualistic side of the system is not a welcome study for one who is of a philosophic bent of mind, we must remember that curiously enough larger space is devoted, to what we in modern phraseology might call Scientific Method, such as the subject of the Pramânas, or the authoritative sources of knowledge, the relation between word and thought, and similar things. It is true that most of these questions find a repetition in the Nyaya, Sankhya, Yoga, and even Vaiseshika. Just as the later Mimamsa of Kumarilla and Prabhâkara exclusively devoted itself to the meaning and utility of sacrifices, leaving the logical portion comparatively in the shade, a reverse phenomenon assailed the Nyaya, depriving it, in its medieval form, of its philosophical character, and making of it a sort of hair-splitting logic, a limbo of sophistic casuistry. The *Pramânas* recognised by Jaiminiare (1) Pratyaksha[68] (2) Anumâna[69]

66. Also cf. Cowell and Gough's Sarvadarsana Sangraha, pp. 178-202. The portion relating to logic was predominant in Jaimini's Sutras. Later on, this aspect was developed more in the Nadiya School of Nyaya. In fact, Jaimini's system is sometimes known as Nyaya.

67. They were scholiasts on Jaimini and their views are diametrically opposed to each other. Kumarila Bhatta is sometimes associated with Sankara in extirpating Buddhism.

68. Sense-perception when the organs are actually in contiguity with an object.

69. Inference or the apprehension of an unseen member of a known association (Vyapthi) by the perception of another seen member.

(3) Upamâna[70] (4) Arthâpatti[71] (5) Sabda[72] and (6) Abbâva[73]. The last, which is recognised only by the Mimamsakas of Kumarilla Bhatta's following, is but a subdivision of Anumána.

Now we come to a very important system of Indian Philosophy and that is the Sankya. It is treated of in an exemplary and elaborate manner in Chap. VI. The Chapter is prefaced with an account of the later Vedanta mixed with Sankhya. But the account is very meagre and has very much disappointed our expectations. We had hoped that it would receive the treatment it deserved at the hands of a scholar who is, perhaps, the best well-meaning student of Indian Philosophy at the present day, and the capacity he possesses as a comparative student of all the world's philosophies would have been immensely useful to us, if he had chosen to dwell fully on these later devolpments of the Vedanta which are inextricably mixed with Sankhya, nay, with the Yoga, in various degrees. To such latter-day off-shoots belong the tenets preached by Brahmananda Saraswati[74], Madhusudana Saraswati[75], Vachaspathi Misra[76], Vignanabhikshu[77], Vallabha[78], Sureswara[79], Srikantha[80], Amalânanda[81], Vidyaranya[82] Appayyadikshita[83] and hosts of other men, not even the names of them being mentioned. But, no doubt, the general analysis of the mixture that is found in the later Vedanta and in the later Sankhya, displays a fund of critical acumen and discrimination of judgement, rarely met with among students of philosophy. Of the medieval Vedantists above mentioned many, nay, most were avowedly of Sankara's following, introducing changes and innovations, of course as suited their fancy, while the rest were carried away by Sankhyan predilections. The terms Avidya, Maya, Prâgña, Siva, Icvara and Prakriti underwent in the hands of these philosophers amazing diversity of explanations. On P. 282, in expounding the doctrine of the later Vedanta, which, looking to the context and the method of explanation, refers evidently to that of Vidyaranya in his Panchadasi, Max Muller says, "The Omniscient, but personal Iswara is there explained *as a reflection of Maya*, but as having subdued her, while the individual soul, Prâgña or Jiva, is represented as having been subdued by Avidya, and to be multiform, owing to the variety of Avidya." This is a flagrant mistake. According to Vidyaranya, in fact the majority of later Vedantists, Iswara is not a reflection of Maya, in which case the statement makes no sense, but *Iswara is a reflection of Brahman in Maya*[84]. This view of Vidyaranya's is what Max Muller is presumably thinking

70 Comparison, knowledge arising from resemblance.

71 Presumption, such knowledge as can be derived of a thing not itself perceived, but implied by another.

72 Verbal information derived from authoritative sources.

73 Not-being, when we infer dryness of the soil from the not-being or absence of clouds or rain.

74 The author of the Laghuchandrika, a commentary on the Brahma-Sutras, on advanced Nyaya principles, recently published at Kumbakonum, Tanjore District.

75 The author of a commentary on the Brahma-Sutras and the Gita and of the Prasthana Bheda, previously referred to.

76 The author of Bhamati, a gloss on Sankara's Brahma-Sutra-Bhashya, of the Sankhya Tattva Kaumudi, a commentary on Icvara Krishna's Sankhya-Karika, and of the Nyaya-Varttika-Tatparya-Tika, a commentary on Udyotakara's Nyaya Varttika.

77 Wrote the Sankhya Pravachana Bhashya, the most authoritative commentary on the Sankhya Sutras, a Bhashya on the Brahma Sutras, the Yoga-Varttika, well-known as one of the stiffest books in Sanskrit, and also a commentary on the Swetasvatara Upanishad.

78 The author of a commentary on the Brahma Sutras and the founder of the Suddhâdvaita School.

79 Sureswara, the author of the colossal Vartika on Sankara's Scholia to the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad.

80 Author of a commentary on the Brahma Sutras, claimed by some as anterior to Sankara's. Vide J. M. Nallaswamy Pillai's translation of Sivagnanabotham, Introduction, pp. iii. *et. seq.*

81 Amalananda, author of Vedantakalpataru, a व्याख्या on Vachaspathi Misra's Bhamati.

82 Vidyaranya, in addition to being the author of Panchadasi, a philosophic treatise, and Jivanmuktiviveka, is the writer also of व्यवरणप्रमेयसंग्रह. He is sometimes identified with Madhava the author of Sarvadarsana Sangraha, and sometimes with Sayana the author of the commentary on the Rig Veda. One thing only we can be certain about, and that is, that Sayana, Madhava, and Vidyaranya are the names of only two brothers, and in the present state of our lack of knowledge, it is unsafe to guess which particular names belonged to any one of these brothers. See, *inter alia*, Krishna Sastry's article on the Vijayanagar Kings, *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. III.

83 Appayyadikshita, author of Parimala, a व्याख्या on Amalananda's Vedantakalpataru and of Siddhantalécasangraha, an independent philosophical work. His Sivatattvaviveka is an excellent digest of the Saiva-Siddhanta philosophy.

84 Panchadasi, Tattvaviveka Prakarana, Slokas 15 and 16. I shall quote from the Panchadasi, Vidyaranya's own words :—

चिदानन्दमयब्रह्म प्रतिबिंबसमन्विता ।
तमोरजस्सत्त्वगुणा प्रकृतिर्द्विविधाचसा ॥
सत्वशुद्धय विशुद्धिभ्यां मायाऽविद्येचतेमते ।
मायाबिंबो वशीकृत्य तांस्यात् सर्वज्ञ ईश्वरः ॥

Ramkrishnâdhvari, Vidyaranya's direct disciple, explains the underlined portion which is relevant to our point thus, मायाबिंबः मायायांप्रतिफलितः चिदात्मा तां मायां वशीकृत्य स्वाधीनीकृत्य वर्त्तमानः सर्वज्ञः सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणकः ईश्वरः स्यात्. People of Vidyaranya's following call Sankara's Maya, Prakriti, and differentiate that Prakriti into Maya and Avidya, according as Sattva is predominant or not in Prakriti.

about. The following statement occurs in p. 285 *supra*, "I suggested once before that this very peculiar style of the Sutras would receive the best historical explanation, if it could be proved that they represent the first attempts at writing for literary purposes in India." We should think, on the other hand, that it is more probable that writing had nothing to do with the style of the Sutras at all, in view of the fact that even at the persent day, *Sutras are learnt by rote*, supplemented by oral teaching from the Guru, and only the *heavier commentaries are read out* from manuscripts. The probability therefore lies more on the side of the view that Sutras were introduced to minimise the labour of students when the mnemonic literature had become unmanageable, than on the side that the Sutra style was in some way necessitated by the introduction of writing at the time.

The Sankhya system is in a sense compact, in so far as all we could know of it are contained in a few books alone. Foremost there is Kapila's Tattva Samasa referred to by Vignana Bhikshu in his Sankhya Pravachana-Bhashya, next we have Icvarakrishna's Sankhyakarikas having three commentaries, one the Bhashya of Gaudapada, the other the Sankhya Tattva Kaumudi of Vachaspathi Misra and the third the commentary of Narayana Tirtha, and lastly we have the modern Sankhya Sutras, about the literary authorship of which there is a good deal of doubt, though some think (advanced originally by Balasastri of Benares in the *Pundit*) that Vignanabhikshu was the author, with three commentaries, one by Aniruddha called Aniruddha vritti[85], the other by Vignanabhikshu called Sankhyapravachanabhashya[86] and the last by Vedantin Mahadeva[85]. All through the discussion in which Prof. Max Muller enters, in trying to ascertain the date of Gaudapada, the Tattva Samasa and the Sankhya-Sutras, he does not make any mention of Aniruddha or his commentary on the Sankhya Sutras. The latter commentator cannot be passed over in silence, in speaking of the dates of the devolpmental stages of theSankhya system, since he is one of the important commentators of the Sankhya-Sutras whose sentences are quoted *ipsissima verba* by Vignana Bhikshu. Professor Max Muller apparently wants to make out that the modern Sankhya Sutras were the latest recension of the Sankhya doctrines which had been handed down from the Upanishad period through ever so many channels of books, tradition, contemporary authors and the like. It would much strengthen the case he wants to support, viz., that the modern Sankhya Sutras may have often changed their dress of language in the hands of the previous disciples, before they received their final literary form, if he could show the relation between the Sutras in Vignanabhikshu's and Aniruddha's commentaries. There is good reason to believe that the Sutras followed in Vignanabhikshu's commentary is different from those in Aniruddha's commentary. Granted that it is so, it would lend the weight of an argument to support Max Muller's view, that the Sutras were undergoing ever so many changes in the shape of accretions and omissions, and even thorough modifications of language, because, if within the limited space of time that divided Vignanabhikshu from Aniruddha there could be so much difference introduced into the text of the Sutras, how much more should have been the case in the wide interval that divided Vignanabhikshu from the fermenting period when Kapila evolved his doctrines? I hope to investigate shortly this striking difference in the apparently identical text of the Sankhya-Sutras used by Aniruddha and by Vignanabhikshu, and think of using the results of such investigation in ascertaining the true character of the Tattva-Samasa. On p. 303 Max Muller states, "Of course we must leave it an open question for the present whether the extreme monistic view of the Veda[87], was due to Sankara, or whether like Ramanuja, he also could claim the authority of Púrvacharyas, in his interpretation of Badarayana's Sutras". Max Muller has evidently forgotten the historical Gaudapada, who in his *Karikas* on the Mandukya Upanishad, shadows forth Sankara's Monism as patently as is conceivable, and the stemma of Sankara we have given elsewhere should give the Professor an idea of Sankara's Purvácharya Parampara, not to mention the names of other eminent teachers referred to by name in his Scholia on the Vedanta Sutras itself. The extreme Monistic view was floating in the air, and worked into the very thought of the thinking Hindus, long, long before Sankara defended it like a Huxley. Upavarsha and Gaudapada are living characters about whom we know so much from their works, and not phantom figments that we have to call up in our minds without knowing anything about their works, history, and so forth.

It is a moot point whether the Sankhya ever paid any heed to the authority claimed for the Vedas by other philosophers, whether it regarded them with feelings of respect and whether it cared to comply with what is enjoined in them. But Max Muller wants to effect a compromise, though not avowing his intention clearly, by asserting "The Sankhya, whatever we may think of its Vedic character, never denies the authority of the Veda in so many words * * * *. Some scholars think that the recognition of the supreme authority of the Sruti was an after-thought with Kapila, a mere stroke

85 Sankhya-Sutras with Aniruddha's and Vedantin Mahadeva's commentaries with Translation, by Dr. Garbe, Bib. Ind. Series.

86 A very good edition of it has recently been brought out by Dr. Garbe in the Harvard University Oriental Series in English characters.

87 Does Max Muller mean by this the Vedanta or the Upanishads?—V. V. R.

of theological diplomacy." Here we must make a distinction between "Not denying the authority of the Veda in so many words" and "Asserting the authority of the Veda, in words, but disregarding, disobeying and insulting it actively in spirit." The two sentences have a common-sense distinction for us, in reality they meant the same thing for the Sankhyas. "The recognition of the supreme authority of the Sruti" was not "an after-thought of Kapila," because he never recognised it except as a sort of sop for the censorious orthodox theists, and that too, for form's sake only, in words; but the flagrant and contemptuous violation of the Vedas in a decided way, and actually finding fault with them on all points, could be seen at every step. "The real theological diplomacy" never appertained to the Sankhya, but to the Sankhya as explained by the later commentators. The reason of this is not far to seek, because we know that the commentators on the Sankhya system were one and all of them Vedantins, and we may well imagine how anxious they would be to explain away Kapila as consistent with a submission to an infallible Veda. Max Müller says, "To judge from a passage in the beginning of the Sankhya-Karikas it might seem indeed that Kapila placed his own philosophy above the Veda. But he really says no more than that certain remedies for the removal of pain enjoined by Veda are good, and that other remedies enjoined by philosophy are likewise good; but that of the two, the latter are better, that is, more efficacious." The first part of the quotation does not picture Kapila in his true complexion; nor does it give a correct idea of what Kapila thought of the Veda. Max Muller is certainly referring to the second Karika of Icvara Krishna when he is 'judging from a passage' and that is,

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः सह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ।

तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥ Here the Veda is distinctly refer.ed to as अविशुद्धि, impure, by Icvarakrishna; and not only impure, but also, ineffectual, defective and so on. This अविशुद्धि is explained as alluding (according to Gaudapada) to पशुघात because it is said,

षट्शतानि नियुज्यंते पशूनां मध्यमेऽहानि ।

अश्वमेधस्य वचनादूनानि पशुभिस्त्रिभिः ॥ We see therefore what Icvarakrishna meant, and how Gaudapada understands what the Karikas signify, though anxious to explain away Kapila in conformity with the Veda; and the later Vedantin, Vachaspathi Micra, is still more anxious to explain away, although he too is not blind to the impure imperfections marring the Veda, when it advocates bloody hecatombs. He adds in his Sankhya Tattvakaumudi,

"अविशुद्धिः" सोमादियागस्य पशुबीजादिवधसाधनता, and thereby feels it is an impure act that in some sacrifices men should go the length of eating the testes of sheep. Withal, he does not rest satisfied until he can make out that the sin involved in the act of killing an innocent animal is slight, by quoting Panchacikhacharya; and therefore the Siddhantin himself is made to say in the course of his defence of killing animals for sacrifices that "अग्निषोमीयं पशुं आलभेत" इत्यनेन वाक्येनच पशुहिंसायाः क्रत्वर्थत्वं उच्यते, नानर्थहेतुत्वाभावः, तथासति वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात्.

So much for the first part of the quotation from Max Muller, but the second part is certainly not the view of Kapila, as Max Muller wrongly declares, but, if we may so put it, is the view as gathered through the Claude Lorraine glasses of the commentator's spectacles. The fact is, Kapila is uncompromising, and Max Muller wrongly lays the view of Vachaspathi Misra, the later Vedantin commentator, to Kapila's charge. But Vignanabhikshu, who is again a Vedantin commentator of the Sankhya and too liberal in his views to be a faithful representative of any system, equates the Sankya and the Vedanta, finding in the former, statements that are throughly endorsed by the Veda (vide Sankhya Pravachana Bhashya I, 5 *infra*.) In p. 302 ambiguity, nay, positive mistake in expression ensues by imperfect punctuation in the sentence "* * * and the Sankhya was clearly dualistic when it postulated Nature, not only as the result of Avidya or Maya, but as something real in the ordinary sense of the word * * *". Here "not only as the result of Maya" should be "not, only as the result of Maya" for, otherwise the sentence makes no sense.[88] Again on p. 305 Max Muller speaks in a compromising way about the Sankhya's view of the authority of the Veda, but I must say once for all that, as a matter of fact, the Sankhyas do not accord to it the respect with which the Vedantins quote it. From the way they are quoted, it would appear they are introduced more for the purpose of showing that they too have the support of the Veda, and that too, not in very great seriousness, and only as an after-thought. They gladly counted upon the sanction of the Veda when it had one, by chance, to give, and quietly ignored it, sometimes agressively attacked it, nay even advanced their doctrines more strongly on that account, when the Veda would not chime in with the Sankhyan cult. The passages in the Sankhya Sutras wherefrom MaxMuller, in P.306, is desirous of establishing the supposed respect shown by the Sankhyas

[88] After this in Max Muller's (p. 304) book there is a reference to Tattvakaumudi v.2. It is a mistake. The reference must be to the 15th Vishaya under Karika II. Vachaspati Misra whom Max Muller cites, be it remembered, was not a Sankhyan, but, a stout follower of Sankara, and he is declared to be a Mithila Brahmin and set down at the 9th cent. A. D., by Ganganath Jha. (See his edition of Sankhya-Tatvakaumudi. Sanskrit Introduction).

to the authority of the Sruti are untenable, since in the Sankhya Sutras, the Advaitist expositors and reconcilers of the Sankhya of a later time, speak a great deal, more than Kapila.

Max Muller puts Vachaspati Misra in the middle of the 12th century A. D., following Prof. Garbe (p. 289), and elsewhere states (p. 479) that "it was not till the 10th century that Vachaspati Misra finally re-established the Brahmanic view of the Nyaya in his Nyaya-Vartika-Tatparyatika." From this it would seem that the Professor is minded to halt between the 10th and the 12th centuries in dating Vachaspathi-Misra, while Ganganath Jha in the Sanskrit introduction affixed to his edition of Sankhya-Tattva-Kaumudi urges some new facts in support of placing him more decidedly in the 9th century A. D. He says[89]

" * * * निश्चितप्रायमेव सम्भाव्यते यदयं विद्वदग्रणीः ख्रिष्टाब्दीय सहस्रतमवर्षात् प्रागेव मिथिलाजनपदं मण्डयामासेति । यतोऽस्य तात्पर्यटीकायाः परिशुद्धिनाम्नी व्याख्या श्रीमदुदयनाचार्यकृताऽद्यापि वरीवर्ति । अयंचोदयनो बङ्गाधिपलक्ष्मणसेनसमये आसीदिति गोवर्धनाचार्यकृत सप्तशतीतस्तथाच बङ्गोपलब्धशिलालेखान्निश्चीयते"; and as regards the mistake Taranatha Tarka Vachaspathi committed[90] in placing Vachaspati Misra posterior to Sree Harsha, the author of the Khandanakhandakadya, because another Vachaspathi was credited with the authorship of the Khandanoddhâra, a criticism of Sree Harsha's work, Mr. Ganganath says;

"तर्कवाचस्पतीनां भ्रान्तिबीजं खण्डनोद्धारनामको ग्रन्थः, किन्त्वस्यकर्ता त्रिंशद्धर्मनिबन्धनिर्माता अपरोवाचस्पतिः मिथिलास्थसुगौना-नगरनिवासीत्यवधेयं" and also "यदयं महात्मा मैथिलब्राह्मण इति निश्चितप्रायमेव". From these it is clear that Vachaspathi Misra was a Maithila Brahmin and should have flourished about the 9th century A. D., for Udayanacharya the author of "Parisuddhi", a commentary on Vachaspathi Misra's Tatparya Tika, lived in the reign of Lakshman Sen of Bengal, of whose era we have just commenced the 8th century. No doubt more than a century must have elapsed for an author to become sufficiently classic and so necessitate commentaries. Taranatha Tarka Vachaspathi is mistaking another Vachaspati who wrote a criticism on Sreeharsha's work and who was posterior to him, for our Vachaspathi Misra. Evidently Tarka Vachaspathi did not note that in Sree Harsha's work we meet with a criticism of Udayana's "Parisuddhi" and of other works; and therefore if Taranatha had read the work, he ought to have inferred that Udayana lived anterior to Sreeharsa; this Udayana being a commentator on Vachaspathi Misra who is mentioned by Gangesa, author of[90] Chintamani, and criticised by him with due respect as Tikakara, must be considered anterior to Sreeharsha. Of course this Sreeharsa is not the Sreeharsha mentioned by Bana[91]. In P. 319 *infra*, when speaking of the arrangement adopted in the Tattva Samasa about the treatment of the various Sankhyan Tattvas and the rest, occurs the sentence "Then follow the topics which are twenty-five in number," and it ought to be corrected either into "the substances which are twenty-five in number" or "the topics which are Twenty-four in number. (See P. 321 where the number of topics correctly enumerated is only 24). In discussing about the primary evolution of Buddhi from Avyakta (Prakriti), Max Muller makes out that it means Prakriti as illuminated, intellectualised and rendered capable of becoming at a later time the germ of Ahamkara (distinction of subject and object), Manas and Indriyas. So, as against the psychological acceptation, he says that Buddhi must also mean a phase in the Cosmic growth of the universe[92]. He is most sensible in giving a cosmic explanation, for, as he says "Though this psychological acceptation is the common acceptation of Buddhi among native writers on Sankhya, yet sense is more important than commentaries." The table on P. 333 is erroneous, as it derives Prakriti from Purusha and therefore negatives what is said in the Tattva Samasa. According to Tattva Samasa, Purusha is identified with the Brahman of the Vedas; it is therefore possible that Sankhya in its primary stages was theistic[93]. The main difference, between the later Karikas and the Tattva Samasa, which is not touched upon by Max Muller, is in the derivation of the Panchamahabhutas. In the former they are derived from the Panchatanmatras while in the latter they are derived direct from Ahamkara. Commenting on the Maitrayanî Upanished II, 5, Maxmuller remarks "The whole is passage is however obscure, nor does the commentator help

[89] Sankhyatattvakaumudi edited by Ganganath Jha. भूमिका, पृष्ठं, १.

[90] Read also introduction to AnnamBhatta's Tarka Sangraha by Athalye, pp. 40 *et. seq.*

[91] Tradition identifies Sriharsha in whose Court Bana flourished with Sreeharsha, the author of Khandanakhandakâdya. But Cowell places the king in the early part of the 7th century A. D. See Cowell and Thomas. Harsha Charita, preface p. vii. Evidently therefore the two Harshas are different.

[92] If we employ the Vedantic terminology, Max Müller's suggestion simply tantamounts to a differentiation of Buddhi into Samashti (cosmic or objective), and Vyashti (subjective or psychic.) This distinction must also affect the Ahamkâra phase of the evolution of Avyakta. Of course when the Ahamkâric stage is reached the differentation becomes only too patent.

[93] *cf. Kâthaka* III, 10, 11 and VI, 7, 8; Also, Sadanandás *Vedanta Sara* § 128.

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us much, unless he is right in recognising here the germs of the later Vedantic ideas of a Prajapathi, called Visva or Vaisvanara, Taijasa, and Prâgña." We do not know what he means here by the later Vedantic ideas. This division is already found in the Mandukya[94] Upanishad and Gaudapada's Karikas to it. We can call the ideas later Vedantic if we put the Mandukya after Sankara. The account of evolution given according to Tattwasamasa is very confusing. The Purusha is represented as superintending Prakriti and hence the efficient cause of Evolution in a sense. MaxMüller's apology for the existence of the Sankhya as a philosophy in the world, and his learned discourse "on the Nature of Pain" from the point of view of Indian philosophers are admirable and well worth reading. Pointing to the two solutions proposed by the Vedanta and the Mimamsa to rid man of the trammels and misery of this world, he says that none of the solutions proposed by other philosophers, either ancient or modern, "seems to me to have so completely realised what may be called the idea of the Soul as the Phoenix, consumed by the fire of thought and rising from his own ashes, soaring towards regions which are more real than anything that can be called real in this life", and later on adds, "Does Kapila really work upon perception and thought as an instrument, ready made by Prakriti for the use of the Purusha, but remaining inert like a telescope, till it is looked through by the Purusha, or is it the first glance of Purusha at Prakriti in its first state of Avyakta or chaos, that gives the first impulse to the activity of Prakriti, which impulse is generally ascribed to the working of the Gunas?" He says he does not feel competent to pronounce any decided opinion for either view. The vindication of Sankhya from page 385 to page 398 is exhaustive and fortified with a good many arguments. The analyis of the human mood or attitude that may have given rise to the Sankhyan cult, on p. 383, and his thoughtful remarks on the special mental or psychic difficulties that ought to have harassed the orginal founders of the Sankhya, bring the ancient problems nearer to our heart. The comparison of the Sankhyan Prakriti and Purusha with the Cartesian *automaton* and *chose pensante*[95] is very instructive. Descartes' theory, in the light of Huxley's explanation, approaches nearer the Sankhyan Prakriti and Purusha, if we forget the reservation which Descartes made in not giving a Purusha to anything else but man. I hope to deal with this fully in my forthcoming paper on "The teachings of Prof. Huxley on the Infinite." The later Sankhyan developments are meagerly touched ; we have to make here the same complaint that Vignanabhikshu and Vachaspathi Misra are left in the dark as we made in connection with the Vedanta as devoloped by its later representatives.

Chap. VII is entitled "Yoga and Sankhya." In it are pointed out the common path travelled over by both Yoga and Sankhya together, and the point from which they began to diverge, as also the leading tenets as embodied in the Yoga-sutras of Patanjali. Points that may appear somewhat startling or surprising to the English mind, not accustomed to the rigorous and, sometimes, hair-splitting dialectics pursued by the Indian Logicians, or rather the philosophers that apply the Indian canons of logic to prove their assertions, are dealt with in a way that will apeal more readily to Englishmen and other Europeans, because always the underlying human springs are exposed, and comparison is instituted between the Greek and Roman philosophers on the one hand and the Indians on the other. In the philosophical portion, Yoga and Sankhya are one except for the fact that the Yoga recognises an Icwara corresponding to the Sagunam Brahman of the Vedantins, and the Sankhya an absolute Purusha. Less stress is laid by the Sankhyans on the aspect of meditation, while more of it is inculcated in the Yoga which has necessitated such an elaborate system of rules and practices to be observed by the Yogins for their Samadhi leading up to Kaivalya "aloneness." In the Sankhya meditation is recommended, though the intellectual method of reasoning and argumentation leading us up to a true discrimination between the Purusha and Prakriti is more what Kapila looks to. In this aspect Yoga is sometimes called the Theistic Sankhya. It is probable that both Yoga and Sankhya grew out of the same undifferentiated matrix, and the divergence set in only a little previous to the period of Sanskrit Renaissance, eventually ending in latter days in a complete divorce between the two systems. The Professor is right when he says that Rajendra Lal Mitra was wrong in representing the belief in one supreme God as the first and most important tenet of Patanjali's philosophy. It was only one of many of the outward steps, which as Bhoja Raja the commentator on Patanjali adds, "towards fixing the mind on one subject and of thus in time obtaining Samádhi."[96] When

[94] We quote some of the passages at length here :—

जागरितस्थानो बहिष्प्रज्ञः सप्ताङ्ग एकोनविंशतिमुखः
स्थूलभुक् वैश्वानरः प्रथमः पादः ॥ ३ ॥
स्वप्नस्थानोऽन्तप्रज्ञः सप्तांङ्ग एकोनविंशतिमुखः प्राविविक्त-
भुक् तैजसो द्वितीयः पादः ॥ ४ ॥
यस्सुप्तो नकंचनकामंकामयते नकंचनस्वप्नं पश्यति तत्
सुषुप्तं । सुषुप्तस्थान एकीभूतः प्रज्ञानघनएवानन्दमयो
ह्यानन्दभुक् चेतोमुखः प्राज्ञस्तृतीय.पादः ॥ ५ ॥

[95] This is superadded by Descartes to the automaton. Prof. Huxley showed that on the Cartesian assumption all our mental conditions are the symbols in consciousness of the changes taking place automatically in the organism. See Huxley. Method and Results, pp. 182-188.

[96] Vide Boja's Scholia on Patanjali's Yoga Sutras I, 33, 2.

comparing Darwin, Kapila and Patanjali, Max Muller says, "Darwin himself went so for as to maintain most distinctly that his system of Nature required a creator who breathed life into it in the beginning." He is thinking of the concluding lines of Darwin's "Origin of Species." Darwin himself distinctly tells us in one of his letters that he alluded to such a Creator simply as a "sop to Cerberus"[97] and to enlist the sympathies of clergymen and the like in propounding a doctrine which was sure to shock the religious susceptibilities of men moving in an altogether different mental groove in their conceptions of a Personal Creator and the whole creation that was of his making. His own opinions were that of an Agnostic. "I think" he says "that generally (and more and more as I grow older), but not always, an agnostic would be the most correct discription of my state of mind" and without doubt, the influence of conclusions deducible from the theory of Evolution, as Edward Clodd says[98] "are fatal to a belief in the Supernatural." Prof. Max Muller would have found a better friend to Kapila and Patanjali in people like Dr. A. R. Wallace. About the Yogic methods of obtaining Samadhi, and the devotional contemplation in which the Yogins indulge, there is a fine and ungarbled account. There is a reference to Mr. M. Seshagiri Sastri's Report of Tamil and Sanskrit Manuscripts, when Max Müller speaking under the section of Vairagya about the doubtful nature of the real authorship[99] of Bhartrihari's Vairagya Catakas. Max Muller thinks he might have collected verses from various sources as Subhashitas and made them into a compact Cataka. In fact Bhartrihari's work is sometimes actually called Subhashitatrisati for which Max Muller refers us to Seshagiri Sastri's Reports (p. 445 *infra*). He credits in a way the 'miracles' wrought by Kriyayogins though with a good deal of reservation. The Siddhis which are the outcome of *Samyama* are not the last and highest goal of Yoga-philosophy as has often been supposed by Indian and by European Scholars. He says touching on the practises of the Modern Hindu Yogins "* * * we must also remember that the influence of the mind on the body and of the body on the mind is as yet but half-explored." In P. 456. Iyengar appears as Jyàngar.[100] In the course of Patanjalis, speculations, wo do not find him locating the mind or the act of perceiving and conceiving, in the brain, or in the pineal gland, but, in one place he claims the muscle of the heart "as the seat of the consciousness of thought."[101] Prof. Max Muller doubts on this score, I believe, if the 34th Sutra, nay, the whole chapter in which it occurs may not be spurious. He cannot understand what is meant when in the terms, 'Vasanas' and 'Samvedanam' Rajendra Lal Mitra[102] is able to discover the theory of *logoi* in the mind of Patanjali, and when he compares the 'three adhwans' through which objects assail one's mind to *the Universalia ante rem, the Universalia in re* and *the Universalia post rem.* The final goal whether of the Yoga, or of the Sankhya, nay even of the Vedanta and of Buddhism, always challenges conception. We cannot predicate of it anything except as a state that transcends everything we know or imagine, and in which there is entire oneness with the spirit of Nature. If we attempt to speak of the *Ultimatum* in language that is necessarily conditioned by the limited nature of our understanding, and by the binding influence of the law of Causality and of Time and Space, we are sure to make of it an unmeaning phantasmagoria. To say therefore that the *finale* of the Yogins implies nihilism is as absured as to say that the *finale* of the Vedantism is atheism. Max Muller is of the same view, and adds speaking of all our philosophers, "There remains with me a strong conviction that Indian Philosophers are honest in their reasonings and never use empty words. But there remains much to be done, and I can only hope that if others follow in my footsteps, they will in time make these old bones to live again. These ancient Sages should become fellow-workers and fellow-explorers with ourselves in unknown continents of thought, and we ought not to be afraid to follow in their track. They always have the courage of their convictions, they shrink from no consequences if they follow inevitably from their own premisses. This is the reason why I doubt whether the admission of an Icwara or Lord by Patanjali, in contradistinction to Kapila, who denies that there are any arguments in support of such a being, should be put down as a mere economy, or as an accomodation to popular opinion" (p. 473.)

"Nyaya and Vaiseshika" form the subject of the eighth chapter. The information about the books on later Nyaya is unfortunately not given by Max Muller even to a fairly good extent, and of course, it is enough for readers who do not think of extending their studies deeper into Nyaya. Gotama's Nyaya Sutras which is commented on by Vâthsyâyana[103] is the chief book Prof. Max Muller follows in giving an account of the Nyaya-system. For a comprehensive summary of the history of the Nyaya philosophy in India, there is not any good book at present

[97] *op. cit* from the chapter on 'Religion' in "Darwin's Life and Letters" in 3 vols., edited by his son, Francis Darwin.

[98] Pioneers of Evolution, From Thales to Huxlay, by Edward Clodd, pp. 160 *et. seq*.

[99] Vide Tawney's metrical translation of Bhartrihari's Catakas, Introduction.

[100] The mistake is certainly imported from Garbe's Handbook on "Yoga and Sankhya" in the Encyclopædia of Indo-Aryan Research series.

[101] Patanjali. Yoga Sutras III. 34. 'हृदये चित्तसंवित्.'

[102] Pantanjali's Yoga Sutras with Bhojaraja's Commentary *Biblioth. Indic. Series*, Translation by R. L. Mitra, III. 9, and IV, 72.

[103] He is also known as Pakshilaswamin.

to which the student might refer with advantage. But what Max Muller gives in his present book, coupled with that given by Mahadeo Rajaram Bodas in his introduction and preface to Athalye's edition of Annambhattàs Tarka Sangraha must be sufficient to anybody who seeks general information on the Nyaya. However to supply the deficiency of the book I shall here give a short account of the salient points of the history of Nyaya. After the Buddhist Dignaga brought out a Scholia, explaining Gotama's Sutras, in Buddhist fashion, came into existence the starting point wherefrom diversity arose in the place of what was previously unity. A whole world of schools was fashioned from time to time, no two agreeing with each other, giving rise to an amount of polemic dialectics that is almost inconceivable. The whole movement eventually culminated in the "Nadiya School," in which the primary aim of the Nyaya as a philosophy searching after the Infinite in Nature and joining Man to It was lost sight of, but Logic as a science began to be developed. Gangesopadhyaya, the author of Chintamani, and Gadadhara, the author of "Gadadhari" which is sometimes looked upon as a sort of scholia on Chintamani, were the two leading men of the Nadiya School. The amount of commentaries, scholia, and dissertations, dealing with subjects dealt with in the Chintamani, we can measure only by cart-loads, making the literature on Indian Logic something very bewildering, and not possible for even a man of unremitting application to master them in his life-time. In the early Nyaya, Udyotakara commented on Vatsyayana in his work the Nyaya-Vartika, and a Scholia on the latter work the Nyaya-Vartika-Tatparya-Tika, was written by Vachaspati Misra, the well-known Vedantin commentator on Sankara's Brahma Sutras. Udayana who lived about the 12th century A. D., wrote a gloss on Vachaspati's work called "Paricuddhi." Udayana and Vachaspathi, and even Gangesa Upadhyaya were attacked by Sreeharsha in his work called Khandanakhandakâdya which is usually set down later than the 14th Century A.D. Khandanoddhâra is the work written by one Vachaspati who lived about the 16th Century and in which attacks were directed against Sreeharsha's views. It may be remarked that Gangecopadhyaya was the man that gave to the logical portion of the Nyaya an extremely prominent place, and his work is truly neither Nyaya in the old sense nor any other phillosophy. The book written by him namely Chintamani is an independent work, which is not indebted to any previous work for the plan or conception, and what it seeks to do is to divest the Nyaya philosophy, of its religious element and to develop and perfect the logic which always preponderated in the Nyaya more than in any other philosophy, because it went to the Infinite by pure reason, as resting on *Pratyaksha*, *Anumana*, *Upamana* and *Sabda*, and which was present though in a less degree in other philosophies, as for instance in the Sankhya and the Mimamsa. In Chintamani, the syllogism as such is perfected to a degree unknown anywhere else and as a consequence, logic reached a finish and exhaustiveness that cannot but vent itself in hair-splitting sophistry, dialectic egg-dancing and ingenious argumentative feats. Annambhatta, and long previous to him, Sankara Misra (who was anterior even to Gangesopadhyaya) had begun the independent work of welding the Nyaya and the Vaiseshika, and making of the mixture an independent system,[104] retaining the Sapthapadarthas and the atomic theory of the Vaiseshikas, appropriating the logic of the Nyaya wholesale, and rejecting the rest from both of these. I was obliged to speak so much about these devolopments of the Nyaya, since what Max Muller gives about these is next to meagre, and as a historian of philosophy, he speaks more about the ancient Gotama-Sutras.

On P. 483, M. N. Dvivedi is mentioned by mistake as the editor and translator of the Yogasarasangraha, instead Ganganath Jha. The Nihcreyasa is, according to Gotama, the *Summum Bonum*, the *Non Plus Ultra* of blessedness, and this can be realised as taught by him through a knowledge of the sixteen great topics of the Nyaya Philosophy. No doubt logic plays a great part also in Jaimini's philosophy, though, it is only in the Nyaya and especially its later devolopments that logic began to be cultivated almost as an independent branch of thought. The Buddhists took immense interest in the Nyaya philosophy, and the many recensions we have in it are due to the first impule given to it at independent exposition by Dignaga, Dharmakirthi and others. And the hot controversy that ensued between the Buddhistic and the Brahminic branch of the Nyaya gave rise to an immense number of dialectic publications from both sides, in the centuries following the Renaissance period of Sanskrit Literature. Gotama's Sixteen Padarthas were rejected by the later Naiyayikas, excepting Pramana and Prameya, and we can easily see that Vitanda, *G*alpa, *Kh*ala and the like deserve a place as topics in schools, that were given to perfecting Logic as a science, as a branch of thought. After dealing with the Nyaya according to Gotama, in order to give us a good glimpse into the attitude of later men as Madhavacharya and others towards the Nyaya as a system of philosophy, Max Muller takes the account of the Nyaya from Madhava and discusses it. We must not lose sight of the fact that as the Nyaya degenerated into logic from being a philosophy, later men who were commentators and staunch friends of the Nyaya betook to it only as a piece of dialectic exercise, having their faith elsewhere in any one of the two prominent systems of philosophy, the Sankhya and the Vedanta, as a whetstone to sharpen their wits and a peg to hang their culture, learning,

104 Of the same school are Bhashaparich chheda with its Commentary Muktavali (of which the Tarkasangraha is an abstract), Sivaditya's Saptapadarthi, Tarkakaumudi, Tarkamrita etc. The school may be said to have restored the Nyaya in a sense after the shock it sustained at the hands of the Nadia School.

and word-display on. People of Vachaspathi Misra's manner who was a Vedantin by creed and culture, well represent this division. But of course if any of the higher philosophic points that may lie smothered under a heap of controversial disquisitions were to be attacked by the Buddhists and others, these people who were the commentators, whatever their own views might have been in philosophy or religion, used to defend the Nyaya against the opponents, for the sole sake of its being a Hindu system. It is also useful to remember that the later Nyaya principles were much useful to men of any system of philosophy in later times, as a strict training and a powerful instrument in attacking each other, just as in these days a good logician of any following converts us to his own creed by the strength of his controversial vigour. The points of resemblance between the Nyaya and the Vaiseshika, their relations to each other are admirably handled in this chapter. Indian and Greek Logic are contrasted and their points of similarity are well emphasised. In p. 500 "Comparison or Anumana" is the heading of a paragraph which ought to be corrected into "Comparison or Upamana". Such mistakes show that Gough whom Max Muller feels bound to thank so much, has done his work very conscientiously, and well testify to Gough's unsparing troubles to run over the proofs. The transformation of sensations into percepts and of percepts into concepts, falling naturally to the function of Manas, have not been fully realised by Indian philosophers, though with the European nations they have assumed larger proportions in importance. Max Muller is of opinion that the Greek and the Indian logic must each be supposed to be autochthonic till better information about the inter-relations of the two countries in the beginnings of the historic period could be had, though the members of a syllogism are curiously enough found both in Aristotle and Gotama. He defends the Nyaya against the accusations brought against it by Ritter in his "History of Philosophy." If the philosophical portion were to be properly sifted and then looked at, if the Indian principles of classification in bringing about the Sixteen Topics which on account of the wrong translation of some people Ritter took to be tables of categories were well analysed, and if the conception of philosophy from the Hindu point of view were well understood, then the Nyaya would have struck Ritter as good a system as any European system of philosophy. In the later or modern Nyaya, Pramana receives the best attention. Max Muller strives a good deal, after telling us what all the Indian schools of philosophy thought of Sphota, to equate it, in significance, conception, and evolution of meaning, to the Greek Logos, and he is most likely right. But the similar growths in the two countries were only autochthonic. There is fault of syntax and confusion of idea in the sentence (p. 524), "The opinion that sound exists always and eternally, and is only made manifest by each speaker, whish is held by the Mimansakas, is rejected by Kanâda, sounds and words being accepted as momentary manifestations only of Eternal Sound". In connection with the meaning of Sphota and with the value of sound as the essence of language, or rather that thoughts cannot exist without words, (an old theory with Max Muller,) Panini who is introduced to us as a philosopher with a cult of his own in Madhava's Sarva Darsanasangraha,[105] is made to bear witness to the validity of the view of Max Muller. Every system of philosophy, nay, all our Hindu scriptures are searched for what they have to say on Sphota, till Max Muller gloriously comes out with the view that the Human Mind, according to himself and Indian philosophy has its true existence, home and life in the Divine Mind, an idea that is little more than hinted in the Neo-Platonic philosophy.

In the last chapter the Vaiseshika philosophy is brought in and the dates of its Sutras are discussed in entirety. Max Muller takes up the work of Haribhadra षड्दर्शन समुच्चयसूत्रं who was a Brahmin convert to Jainism and died in 528 A. D. From the treatment the Vaiseshika receives in his work, from the researches of Prof. Leumann in Jaina literature, and from the dates derived from Tibetan sources, brought to light by the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society, the Vaiseshika Sutras are set down in the first century A.D. The tenets of the Vaiseshika as given in the Vaiseshika Sutras and their later recension as given to us in Annambhatta's book are described. The chief commentator of the Vaiseshika Sutras, Pracastapâda, does not so much as even receive a mention in the book. According to our Professor, the Greek atomic theory as expounded by Empedocles and others have nothing to do with the Indian system. Kanada's atoms are supposed never to assume visible demensions till there is a combination of three double atoms, neither the single nor the double atoms being supposed to be visible by themselves. This is not the view taken by any of the Epicurean Philosophers. Therefore the conception is quite peculiar to Kanada and it distinguishes him from the Greeks as being thoroughly independent in speculation. The last category of the Vaiseshika philosophy, Samavâya (Inhesion or Inseperability) is peculiar to the Indian soil. The relationship and interdependence and inseperability between two halves and a whole, for instance, though known to European philosophies did not receive a name of its own. This is another of the proofs that our logic is of independent origin, and worked out by our ancient thinkers in times lost to memory. At the end, the whole of the Six Systems are summed up, with the object of tracing the common fountain from which all the rivers have taken their rise. They have all sprung from the same soil

105 Cowell and Gough. Sarva Darsana Sangraha, *Translation*, Trubner's Oriental Series pp. 203, et. seq.

though cultivated by different hands. Vignana Bhikshu is quoted largely to bear out the Professor's view. To illustrate with what regard or contempt, each system of thought was considered at particular periods of Indian philosophic activity or intellectual life, opinions from the Bhagavat Gita, the Mahabharata down to the Padmapurana are quoted by Vignana Bhikshu. And to him behind all the manifold diversity of cults of Indian Philosophy, there is the same attempt to find the Divine Mystery that pervades the visible universe. They represent various stages reached by different phases of thought in their endeavours to unravel the mystery of the apparent disparity of the Universe, and to unite the inner Man with the outer God.

Whatever may be thought of the study of Indian Philosophy as a piece of intellectual training, there is no doubt, that to the seriously thinking student, it opens out vistas that transcend the reach of his vision, and gives him glimpses of the majestic Enigma of this Cosmic Scheme, setting him thirsting for the real Light. It is doubtful if the philosophers of any other nation in the world went the length of seeing in the splendour of the Inner Self the blinding glory of the pulsating Spirit of Nature. And it is this solemn eloquence that is implied in the silence, or the dim reservation, of our philosophers, when they have to touch upon topics appertaining to the Infinite Goal of man and all the passing Panorama of sound and music, of wail and woe, and sometimes of cheer and happiness, that rings in the ears of Max Muller with a thousand tongues, when he exclaims, "To have mounted to such heights, even if we have to descend again frightened and giddy, must have strengthened the muscles of human reason, and will remain in our memory as a sight never to be forgotten, even in the lower spheres in which we have to move in our daily life and amidst our daily duties. Speaking for myself I am bound to say that *I have felt an acquaintance with the general spirit of Indian philosophy as a blessing from my very youth, being strengthened by it against all the antinomies of being and thinking, and nerved in all the encounters with the scepticism and materialism of our own Ephemeral philosophy.*"[106] This is the testimony of a man who has devoted years of patient study to mastering our philosophy, and only a true Vedantin can obtain the comfort and mental quietitude he has derived, as necessaries to brave the fleeting phantoms of this work-a-day world. It is in India alone that Religion and Philosophy have lived in indissoluble unison, the one nerved with the freedom of right-thinking from Philosophy and the other mellowed by the sweetness of spirituality from Religion. Divorce is unknown in India between Philosophy and Religion, and the fatigue of one soft sister never became the strength of the other. To us it has always been taught by our ancient Seers that spiritual realms are not beyond our ken, even when our souls are tabernacled in the flesh, and that glories of the next world can be sensed in this. But up those narrow stairs, and steep galleries which we should tread before sighting our original Home, and breathing the atmosphere that is congenial to our true natures, we should carry with us the lamp of that maxim that has been uttered with stately melody, by one of our own earlist Brahmavadins :—

सत्यप्रतिष्ठायां क्रियाफलाश्रयत्वात् 107

V. V. RAMANAN.

106 The italics are of my own introduction.
107 Pantanjali, Yoga-Sutras, II, 36.

CORRESPONDENCE.

A QUERY.

In Prof. Max Muller's Translation of the Upanishads published in "the Sacred Books of the East," the copy of Mundakòpanishad followed does not seem to have been a complete one. For we miss a translation of the following text or mantra :—

अपि वा यश्चण्डालः शिव इति वाचं वदेत् तेन सह संवदेत्, तेन सह संवसेत्, तेन सह भुञ्जीत ।

"Apivá yas chandálas Siva iti vácham vadét téna saha samvadêt, téna saha samvasét, tena saha bhungîta"
which means :—"A chandála though a person is, if he utters the name *Siva*, converse with him, live with him, dine with him."

This text is quoted as from the Mundaka Upanishad by the first great commentator on the Vèdanta Sutras, Nîlkhantha Siváchárya, in his commentary on Sutra 16, Pada I of Addhyáya IV. Appaiya Dîkshita quotes also this very text in his Sikharinimálà, but at this distance of time it is difficult to determine whether the Dikshita quotes it at first hand from the Upanishad itself or only indirectly from the commentary of Nilkantha Siva Acharya. Whichever it is, it must be conceded that in Appaiya Dikshita's time this mantra must have been well-known as a genuine text of the Upanishad, for else the genuineness of it must have been questioned, especially in an age when religious controversy and philosophical wordfight were the order of the day. Besides, some later works also have been shown to refer to or quote the same text "Apiva etc;" these, to mention the more important among them, are Bodhàyana Vritti, Nàmakoumudi, Nàmarasayanam, Bhàkti-mimamsa and Hariharabheda-dhikkaram of Bôdhëndra Yadindra.

It is this same text of the Mundakopanishad which the great author of Dràvida Bhâshya also, Sivagnânaswamigal, translates into Tamil:—

"சிவனென்னு மொழியைக் கொடிய சண்டாளன் செப்பிடி னவனுடனுறைக. அவனொடு கலந்து பேசுக வவனோடருகிருந் துண்ணுகவென் றுய, உவமையில் சுருதிப்பொருள்." (The incomparable sruti which says:—("If even a wretched chandala utters the name "Siva," live with him, converse with him, abide near and dine with him"). In this it will be seen that the author explicitly speaks of it as a mantra of the sruti. The sense of this text is also embodied in the following stanza of Appar Swamigal's Devaram:—

"ஆவுரித்தத்தின்றுழலும் புலையரேனுங் கங்கைவார்சடைக்கரந்தார்க் கன்பராகி லவர்கண்டீர்யாம் வணங்குங் கடவுளாரே"

When thus we find so many references to this mantra in various Sanskrit and Tamil writers, it seems strange that none of the copies of the Mundaka Upanishad collated by Prof. Max Muller contained this mantra. It is a significant fact, however, that Sankaracharya in his Bhashya or commentary on the Upanishads, has omitted this mantra. And might this omission have been primarily due to the Acharya's inability to explain this mantra in accordance with his Mayâvâda System.

SENTINATHA AIYER.

ON URNS IN ANCIENT SOUTH INDIA.

We have great pleasure in publishing the following, regarding the use of urns among the Tamils in ancient times, from Mr. C. Brito, an eminent Tamil Scholar of Ceylon:—

Sir,

I had occasion to look into Dr. Caldwell's "Grammar of the Dravidian Languages" for something that I wanted, and I accidentally came upon the statement (p.594, 2 ED.) that there is no tradition in the Tamil literature as to the race which used the burial urns found in different parts of the Dekkan. I give below the translation of two stanzas from the collection known as the Pura-nâ-nüru. They prove that it was the Tamils who used these urns. Both stanzas are lamentations put, by the poets who composed them, into the months of the widows of the illustrious dead whom they celebrate.

Stanza 228. "Pot-making Chief, pot-making chief, pot-making chief, of the extensive old city from whose kiln, the thick rolling smoke, in colour resembling condensed darkness, covers the broad sky. You must be pitied. You have a difficut work.

The great Valavan, (owner) of the elephant of the waving flag, scion of the race of the Chempiar, who spread his army to the limits of the Earth, who was deservedly praised by poets, whose greetness shone far and wide, like the spreading rays of the rising sun, has gone to the world of the gods; if you desire to make the capacious urn for such a man, is it any way possible for you to make it, (using) the Earth for your wheel and the Mahâmeru for clay?"

Stanza 256. Pot-making chief, pot-making chief, pot-making chief, of the extensive old city of this extensive wide world, kindly make a sepulchral urn so that it may be broad (enough) for me also, who have come with him through many desert places, like a little white lizard perched on a spok of the axled wheel." The original for "sepulchral urn" is சமத்தாழி. The commentator renders it as முதுமக்கட்டாழி, which is very much like the முதுமுத்தர்தாழி, by which the Doctor says he has heard the urn described.

This urn or jar is also found in stanzas 238 and 364. The first begins thus:—

"He is gone to the ground where revel, as they like, the eagle perched on the convex surface of the covered beautiful urn, (the bird) *pohuval*, the fearless hard-beaked crow and the owl, in the company of assembled devils &c."

[காடு which I have translated " ground " is both சுடுகாடு and இடுகாடு *i. e.*, burning ground and burying ground]

Stanza 364 ends thus: "On the day he reached the ground containing the urns" *i. e.*, he was buried or burnt.

I must confess, I do not remember reading anything about the burial urns, except in the instances given above.

I trust others will be able to furnish more information on this interesting subject.

NEGOMBO, CEYLON. C. BRITO.

AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER.

NOTES AND COMMENTS.

We extract the following from Professor Bullock's article on the intercourse in the past between China and foreign countries.

"The Buddhist religion was the great link between India and China. It has nowhere been recorded how the Chinese first came to hear of this creed. But it is known that in the year of our Lord 65 the then Emperor sent an express mission to India, and that two years later the ambassadors returned, bringing with them priests to teach

the new faith. For ten centuries after that time, we are told missionaries from India were constantly coming both by the overland route and by the way of the sea. At the same time not a few pilgrims from China made the difficult journey to India; and some of them have left accounts of their travels, giving interesting and valuable information concerning the countries which they visited. Buddhism in China had its alternations of fair weather and foul. After its first acceptance, there came a period of persecution, when its books were destroyed, its temples burnt to the ground, its priests relentlessly hunted down and slain. Then, again, Emperors and Empresses arose, who showered every favor on the ministers of the the cult. Later the feeling of both statesmen and people lapsed into one of utter indifference; and so it has been now for many centuries. There is a curious tale told—a true one—which shows how great at one period were the power and the boldness of the priests. A certain Emperor, grown old and weary of affairs of state, gave over the reins of power. There came a time of national difficulty, and the retired Sovereign was called forth by the popular voice to assume the direction of the government once more. But the priests intervened: the erst monarch had become one of them: he must pay a heavy fine before he could leave his cell and return to secular pursuits. The priests had their way and the fine was paid.

What has been the effect upon China of the Buddhist religion? A competent authority, who certainly had no prejudice in favour of Buddhism, tells us that its salutary influence on the national life of China cannot anyhow be denied. One freely acknowledges that it must have worked good in early days, when it was a live faith; and as the present is the child of the past, may be the Chinese of to day benefit by what it did of old. But at the present moment the Buddhism of China is a thing of naught. Crowds of people, whether by custom or for amusement, flock to the shrines of certain days do their obeisances, burn their incense, make a tiny pecuniary offering and go home again; but the effect on their thoughts, on their actions, for all one can see, is nothing. The opinion of the educated Chinese themselves is that Buhdhism in its early days was good, and its teaching beneficial, but that it has long become merely a machine by which crafty priests cheat and defraud the people."

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As will appear from the extracts given in the Review of Professer Max Muller's latest work appearing elsewhere, we are glad to find that the veteran Professer speaks appreciatingly of our humble work and of the great great importence of South Indian Philosophy and Literature. The Professor says. "The longer I have studied the various systems, the more have I become impressed with the view taken by Vignana Bikshu and others, that there is behind the variety of the six systems, a common fund of what may be called National or Popular philosophy a large Manasa lake of philosophical thought and language, far away in the distant North and in the distant Past from which each thinker was allowed to draw for his own purposes." We have now and then indicated what this old philosophy was and which is connected with the present national and popular philosophy, sud we will have occasions to explain at greater lengh on this subject in the near future. Our other remarks we reserve to the next issue.

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The Abkari.

The July number of the Abkari is a very interesting one. It contains the report-98-99 of the "Anglo Indian Temperence Association" as also the report of the annual meeting held on the 15th of June. We are glad to note that the work of the Association has been very useful and highly successful. Regarding the Temperance work in the Madras Presidency Mr. Grubb found a good deal of slackness among many of our societies; and that no suitable Indian had been found to act as a lecturer for this Presidency. We are glad to note, however, that Divan Bahadur Rakunatha Raw has promised to resume work ere long, and that the veteran temperance preacher Rev. Thomas Evans is again returning to our country. As one of the articles of our faith is strict abstinence, we hope, that our Saiva Samajas and Siddhanta Sabhas will find no difficulty in getting themselves affiliated as branches to the "Anglo Indian Temperance Association." At any rate they should keep themselves in active touch with the secretary, Mr. Frederic Webb, offices 33 North side Clapham Common, London S. W. The Magazine contains two full page illustrations and several other portraits of eminent temperance workers. We cull elsewhere from one or two interesting bits in the same number.

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A Tamil Daily-Swadesamitran.

We are glad to note that, for the first time in the History of the Tamil country, we have a daily Tamil newspaper, "Suthesa-Mitran." Thanks to the energy and enterprise of Mr. G. Subramania Iyer B. A., who has converted it into a daily. We wish our contemporary a long life and an useful and successful career.

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The Tamil Upanishadartha Deepika

We are also glad to find that the editor of the "Upanishad Artha Deepika" has adopted our suggestion to print the text in Grantha characters also. The work is being turned out very neatly and at very great trouble and labour, and we hope the Monthly will have a wider circulation among the Tamil people.

"Inspiration, Intuition, Ecstacy."

We owe our sicerest apologies to Pandit A. Govindacharyar for not having noticed his pamphlets and books earlier. In his pamphlets on Inspiration, Intuition and Ecstasy, Mr. Charyar has given us the benefit of his vast reading of the philosophic literature of both the past and the present, of both of India and Europe. His first lecture he reviews the thought of Europe from the days of the earliest Greek Philosophers down to the time of the immortal poet Tennyson. Of course this review is more concerned with the question of innate ideas and the ultimate basis of knowledge. In Part II we have a learned discussion of the several phases of Indian philosophy with special reference to the Yoga and Bakhti Mârgas. In Part III we have the author's impressions of the best of the teachings of Theosophy, together with the struggles and difficulties which he had to go through in the pursuit of knowledge and truth. These pamphlets bear every mark of earnestness, sincerity and truth, and we recommend them for the perusal of every earnest student of religion. Mr. Govinda Charyar's Gita deserves a very long notice and we defer the task for a future number.

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The Nityanusandhana Series in Tamil and English.

We were agreably surprised when we received the first three parts of the Nityanusandhanam Series containing the text and translation in English with valuable notes and comments of some of the famous hymns of the Tamil Alwars. For, this was what we were heartily wishing should be done so as to bring home to the Tamil students and others as to what treasures of philosophic and religious thought was available to us in our own mother tongue. The first part is devoted to Tiruppállându of Periyálwar. The second part contains the text and translation and very useful introduction of Tondaradippodi Alvar's Turuppalli Yeluchchi. The third part contains the famous hymn sung by the saintess of the Vaishnavas, Sri Andal, and it contains very valuable introduction of nearly 6 pages which any body who wishes to have a good idea of the Vaishnava philosophy must surely go through. The principal tenets of this school are illustrated from passages from Tiruppávai and also corresponding passages from the Upanishads. The subject of the *Thiripatharta* is also fully illustrated f. om passages from the Upainshads; and it will be noticed what great agreement there is between our Siddhanta and the Visishtadvaita. The subject is so well treated that you would even excuse the trick of the author in introducing the word Narayana between brackets in almost every passage cited from the Upanishads, even though the word never even once occurs in most of these Upanishads. The learned editor is Mr. M. B. Srinivasa Iyengar M. A. Translator, Educational Department Mysore, and the books are prettily got up and printed in the Kalaratnakaram Press, Madras.

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A Saiva Siddhanta Catechism in Tamil.

We ought to thank our brother Thiruguana-Sambandaswami Pillai, secretary of the Saiva Siddhanta Sabha of Trichinopoly for a copy of this interesting and learned Catechism of the Saiva Siddhanta religion and philosophy. The book is divided into twelve chapters, discussing variously the nature of the world, of Chit, of the books held as authorities by the Saiva schools, of the nature of Pathi, His Sakti, His Sons, of the nature of Pasu and Mukti and an account of the great teachers of this school, and of the places and waters held sacred by the Saivas. The book is embellished with several fine wood cuts of the gods and of the pagodas and Acharyas. The book is a very learned one and ought to be in the hands of every Tamil student of the Saiva Siddhanta. The priniting and get up is creditable to the Madras Mattuvar Kulalambal Press. The book is priced cheap being only 8 annas.

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We thank the learned Editor of the Madras Mail for the following kind review of our July number which appeared in the issue of 30th August 1899.

"The July number of the *Siddhanta Deepika*, or the Light of Truth, an Anglo-Tamil monthly magazine, contains some very interesting contributions. Mr. A Mahadeva Sastri gives another instalment of his learned translation of the Vedanta Sutras with Srikantha Bhashya, and Mr. J. M. Nallasami Pillai has begun the translation of Sivagnana Siddhiar of Arul Nanthi Siva Chariar; which is a Tamil work devoted to a discussion of the different systems of Indian Philosophy. Mr. R. Shanmuga Moodelliar continues his translation of Thayumanavar's poems, which are, so to speak, the Tamilian's Hymn book. The leading article in the magazine is a review of a book on "The Age of Manicka Vachakar," the great South Indian Brahmin saint who is said to have lived about the second century after Christ. Pundit D. Savariroyan also discourses on Tamil Philology."